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ABSTRACT 
 
Total  Factor  Productivity  (TFP)  growth  is  based  on  the  growth  accounting  methodology 
pioneered by Robert Solow (1956) which peaked in the 1970s. It was not until the early 1990s 
that the TFP growth accounting framework came back to examine the East Asian experience. 
The  aim  of  the  thesis  is  twofold:  (1)  to  review  the  literature  on  TFP  growth  accounting 
framework and (2) is to empirically estimate TFP growth on 21 developed OECD countries from 
1996-2004. In doing so, the thesis will attempt to update the literature on TFP growth. v  
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................. IV 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................. V 
LIST OF TABLES ..................................................................................................... VIII 
LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................... IX 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................................. X 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1 
1.1:  Aim of the Thesis............................................................................................................. 1 
1.2:  Scope and Outline of the Thesis ..................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER 2: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF ECONOMIC GROWTH ......................................... 3 
2.1:  Introduction .................................................................................................................... 3 
2.2:  History of Economic Growth ........................................................................................... 4 
2.3:  Factors Contributing to Economic Growth ..................................................................... 6 
2.3.1:  Capital Deepening: ...................................................................................................... 6 
2.3.2:  Labour Productivity ..................................................................................................... 8 
2.3.3:  Degree of Openness  .................................................................................................... 9 
2.4:  Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 11 
CHAPTER 3: THE NEOCLASSICAL GROWTH MODEL ......................................................... 12 
3.1:  Introduction .................................................................................................................. 12 
3.2:  The Theory of Capital .................................................................................................... 12 
3.3:  The Mechanics of the Neoclassical Growth Model ...................................................... 13 
3.3.1:  The First Assumption ................................................................................................ 14 
3.3.2:  The Second Assumption............................................................................................ 16 
3.3.3:  The Third Assumption ............................................................................................... 17 
3.3.4:  The Fourth Assumption ............................................................................................ 18 
3.3.5:  The Fifth Assumption ................................................................................................ 19 
3.3.6:  The Implications of Factor Accumulation on GDP Per Capita .................................. 20 
3.4:  Empirical Application of the Neoclassical Growth Model ............................................ 23 
3.4.1:  Output per unit of Labour ......................................................................................... 24 vi  
 
3.4.2:  Capital per Unit of Labour  ......................................................................................... 24 
3.4.3:  Share of Capital ......................................................................................................... 26 
3.4.4:  Total Factor Productivity Growth for the USA from 1909-1949  ............................... 26 
3.5:  Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 30 
CHAPTER 4: LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................... 31 
4.1:  Introduction .................................................................................................................. 31 
4.2:  The Cambridge Controversy ......................................................................................... 31 
4.3:  The Kaldorian Technical Progress Function .................................................................. 33 
4.3.1:  Kaldor’s Three Propositions ...................................................................................... 36 
4.4:  The Salter Model ........................................................................................................... 37 
4.5:  Learning-By-Doing ......................................................................................................... 39 
4.6:  The Shell Model ............................................................................................................ 42 
4.7:  Convergence Hypothesis .............................................................................................. 45 
4.8:  Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 50 
CHAPTER 5: TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY ESTIMATIONS ................................................ 51 
5.1:  Introduction .................................................................................................................. 51 
5.2:  A Review of Young (1994)-Lessons from the East Asian NICS: A Contrarian View....... 52 
5.3:  Estimating Trends in Australia’s Productivity: The Commonwealth Treasury ............. 58 
5.4:  Methodology for calculating TFP .................................................................................. 59 
5.4.1:  Data limitation and scope ......................................................................................... 60 
5.4.2:  Explanatory Variables ............................................................................................... 61 
Output (ý) .......................................................................................................................... 61 
Labour (ĺ) ........................................................................................................................... 62 
Capital (ḱ) .......................................................................................................................... 62 
Capital and labour share of output (α+β=1) ..................................................................... 63 
5.4.3:  Summary of Explanatory Variables ........................................................................... 65 
5.4.4:  Documented Procedure ............................................................................................ 66 
Determining the Ideal Data Set ........................................................................................ 66 
Construction of Table  ........................................................................................................ 67 
Deriving the Explanatory Variables  ................................................................................... 67 
5.5:  Empirical Results ........................................................................................................... 69 
5.5.1:  Empirical Results for Cluster 1 .................................................................................. 70 
Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Australia ............................................. 70 
Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for the United States of America ............. 71 
Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Canada ................................................ 72 vii  
 
Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Japan  ................................................... 73 
5.5.2:  Empirical Results for Cluster 2 .................................................................................. 74 
Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for the United Kingdom ........................... 74 
Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Austria ................................................ 75 
Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Czech Republic ................................... 76 
Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Denmark ............................................. 77 
Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Finland ................................................ 78 
Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for France ................................................. 79 
Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Germany ............................................. 80 
Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Greece ................................................ 81 
Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Ireland ................................................ 82 
Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Italy ..................................................... 83 
Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Luxembourg  ........................................ 84 
Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Netherlands ........................................ 85 
Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Norway ............................................... 86 
Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Portugal .............................................. 87 
Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Spain ................................................... 88 
Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Sweden ............................................... 89 
Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Switzerland ......................................... 90 
5.5.3:  Update of Alwyn Young’s estimate of TFP Growth 1970-1985 ................................ 91 
5.5.4:  Percentage Annual Growth of TFP from 1970-1985 and 1996-2004 ....................... 91 
Update of TFP estimates for Cluster 1 .............................................................................. 91 
5.5.5:  Percentage Annual Growth of TFP from 1970-1985 and 1996-2004 ....................... 92 
Update of TFP estimates for Cluster 2 .............................................................................. 92 
5.5.6:  Analysis of TFP Growth Variance from 1970-1985 and 1996-2004.......................... 93 
5.6:  Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 95 
 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 97 
6.1:   Policy Implications ....................................................................................................... 97 
6.2:  Final Remarks ................................................................................................................ 99 
REFERENCE LIST ................................................................................................... 101 
 
 viii  
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 2.1:  Real GDP per Capita (US$) for Developed Economies 1700-1980 ............................. 5 
Table 2.2:  Real GDP per Capita (US$) for Developing Economies 1700-1980............................. 5 
Table 2.3:  Gross Stock of Machinery and Equipment per Capita (US$1990) .............................. 7 
Table 2.4:  Gross Stock of Non-Residential Structures per Capita (US$1990) ............................. 7 
Table 2.5:  GDP per Hour Worked (US$1990) .............................................................................. 8 
Table 2.6:  Exports per Capita (US$1990) ................................................................................... 10 
Table 3.1:  Estimation of A(t) ...................................................................................................... 27 
Table 5.1:  Annual Growth of Output per Capita from 1960-1985 ............................................ 53 
Table 5.2:  Annual Growth of Output per Worker from 1960-1985 .......................................... 54 
Table 5.3:  Annual Growth of Total Factor Productivity from 1970-1985  .................................. 56 
Table 5.4:  Australian TFP Estimates from 1978-2000 ............................................................... 58 
Table 5.5:  A List of the 21 OECD Economies to be analysed ..................................................... 60 
Table 5.6:  Alpha Boundaries ...................................................................................................... 64 
Table 5.7:  Deriving the Explanatory Variables  ........................................................................... 68 ix  
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 3.1:  Perfectly Inelastic Labour Supply Curve ................................................................... 15 
Figure 3.2:  Positive Marginal Products ....................................................................................... 16 
Figure 3.3:  Diminishing Marginal Productivities ......................................................................... 18 
Figure 3.4:  Dynamics of the Neoclassical Growth Model ........................................................... 21 
Figure 3.6:  Graphical representation of A(t) ............................................................................... 28 
Figure 4.1:  Technical Progress Function ..................................................................................... 34 
Figure 4.2:  The Salter Model ....................................................................................................... 37 
Figure 4.3:  The (AK) Model ......................................................................................................... 41 
Figure 4.4:  Evidence of Convergence within the United States of America ............................... 47 
Figure 4.5:  -Divergence and the Twin Peaks Hypothesis ......................................................... 49 
Figure 6.1:  Increased Savings Rate.............................................................................................. 98 
 x  
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I cannot begin to describe the deep gratitude I have for the countless hours of which Dr Ranald 
Taylor, the supervisor of my thesis has devoted in the past months. His support and guidance 
has played an imperative role in the facilitation of the thesis. It was Dr Ranald Taylor who above 
all sparked my interest in economic growth and has had a monumental impact to my education. 
I would also like to thank Dr Ranald Taylor for his patience and understanding whilst I relocated 
to Canberra to begin my career as an economist for The Commonwealth Treasury; for this I am 
forever indebted. 
I would also like to thank my family for their continuous support and encouragement whilst 
studying and researching at Murdoch University. Their moral support has helped me construct 
my thesis. 1  
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
1.1:  Aim of the Thesis 
 
A large proportion of economic literature on Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth is based on 
the growth accounting methodology pioneered by Robert Solow (1956) which peaked in the 
1970s. It was not until the early 1990s that the TFP growth accounting framework came back to 
examine the East Asian experience. The aim of the thesis is twofold: (1) to review the literature 
on TFP growth accounting and (2) is to empirically estimate TFP growth on 21 developed OECD 
countries from 1996-2004. In doing so, the thesis will attempt to update the literature on TFP 
growth.  A  novel  feature  of  the  thesis  is  that,  unlike  other  previous  studies,  it  provides 
comprehensive estimates of TFP growth of developed OECD countries from 1996-2004. 
 
1.2:  Scope and Outline of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is organised into chapters; Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of historical economic 
growth. In this chapter, the origin and history of economic growth is explored. Factors affecting 
the economic growth observed in the 1870s will be discussed with specific reference to the 
literature put forward by Adam Smith (1776) and Angus Maddison (2007). 
 
Chapter 3 explores briefly the literature of capital and features an extensive analysis of the 
Neoclassical Growth Model. Chapter 3 is critical to the thesis as it outlines the methodological 
framework which features in the forthcoming empirical chapter. 2  
 
Chapter 4 examines some of the literature in response to Solow (1956 and 1957). The literature 
examined in Chapter 4 includes the Cambridge Controversy, the alternative models developed 
to explain capital and convergence hypothesis as a practical application of the Neoclassical 
Growth Model. 
The central aim of this thesis is dedicated to Chapter 5; that is to empirically estimate TFP 
growth for 21 developed OECD countries. In doing so, the thesis will attempt to update the 
literature  on  TFP  growth.  The  beginning  of  this  chapter  analyses  the  method  and  results 
obtained by Alwyn Young (1994) in his estimations of TFP growth. Methodological issues and 
data  limitations  will  be  discussed  prior  to  the  estimates  of  TFP  growth.  In  addition  the 
methodology used to estimate TFP growth will be compared to a similar study conducted by 
the  Commonwealth  Treasury  to  ensure  a  robust  examination  of  TFP  growth.  Finally,  the 
estimated findings from this study will be compared to the estimates by Young (1994) in an 
attempt to update Young’s original TFP estimates. 
Chapter  6  explores  the  policy  implications  from  updated  TFP  estimates  for  central  policy 
agencies and summarises the aims and findings of the thesis. 3  
 
CHAPTER 2: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF ECONOMIC GROWTH  
 
2.1:  Introduction  
 
Over the past millennium, world population rose nearly 24-fold, per capita income 14-fold and 
GDP 338-fold. This contrasts sharply with the preceding millennium, when world population 
grew by only a sixth, and per capita income fell. After 1820, world development became much 
more dynamic. 
(Maddison, 2007 p.69) 
 
The  aim  of  this  chapter  is  to  provide  an  historical  overview  of  economic  growth  focusing 
particularly on developed economies and to establish a backdrop for economic analysis in the 
forthcoming chapters. In the interest of keeping the thesis to a realistic size, a brief timeline of 
global economic development will commence from 1776 with Adam Smith and will examine 
Angus Maddison (2007) specifically in the field of historical macroeconomics. 
The global economy has benefited from Smith (1776), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of 
the  Wealth  of  Nations  (The  Wealth  of  Nations).  The  above  statement  by  Maddison  (2007) 
highlighted the extent of economic progress thereafter. Population grew twenty two-fold, per 
capita income by fourteen-fold and world GDP by a three hundred and thirty eight-fold (Smith, 
1776 and Maddison, 2007). From the year 1000 to 1820, growth in global per capita income 
remained steady however after the 1820s there was an acceleration of growth with uneven 
distribution causing regions of great wealth and poverty (Maddison, 2001a; 2001b and 2007 
and Crafts, 1983). According to data from Maddison (2007), the developed OECD countries such 
as; Western Europe, North America, Australia and Japan experienced significant increases in per 4  
 
capita  income  with  a  widening  gap  between  the  poorest  regions  of  Africa  now  at  20:1 
(Maddison, 1995a; 1995b and 2007). 
2.2:  History of Economic Growth  
 
In Smith’s third book of The Wealth of Nations, he described early economic growth being the 
relationship  between  the  citizens  of  the  town  and  the  country  (Smith,  1776).  The  country 
supplies the town with the means for subsistence such as materials or land and the town 
transforms the materials provided by the country into agricultural produce or manufactured 
goods  to  be  redistributed  back  to  the  citizens  (Smith,  1776).  The  progression  of  economic 
growth therefore lies within the people who service the land and its resources. The cultivator 
who selects a land to cultivate therefore also attracts a variety of services towards that land 
who specialise in various arts to serve the needs and wants of the cultivator. Smith describes 
that masons, ploughwrights, bricklayers, tanners, shoemakers and tailors offer their services. 
Occasionally these people will call upon each other’s expertise to service the growing demands 
(Smith 1776, Maddison, 2001a and 2001b). 
There exists a mutual relationship between the citizens of the town and the country where the 
division of labour in various occupations results in a wealth of agricultural and manufactured 
goods with the excess production being traded to neighbouring towns for their comparative 
advantage. The agricultural sector forms the backbone following a natural progression towards 
the  manufacturing  sector  with  even  greater  wealth  derived  in  the  final  phase  of  foreign 
commerce  (Smith  1776,  Maddison,  2001a;  2001b  and  2007).  Foreign  commerce  is  the 5  
 
exportation of excess capital to other economies. Smith argued that newly discovered trade 
routes  of  America  and  the  southern  route  to  Asia  opened  up  significant  opportunities  for 
economies of scale, specialisation and international trade leading to economic growth (Smith, 
1776; Maddison, 1983; 1991; 2001a; 2001b and 2007, p.104). Table 2.1 and 2.2 demonstrates 
the growth of real GDP per capita. 
Table 2.1:  Real GDP per Capita (US$) for Developed Economies 1700-1980 
Country  1980  1965  1950  1913  1870  1820  1760  1700 
United 
Kingdom 
2544  2046  1439  1025  668  312  233  205 
United 
States 
4295  3229  2384  1344  567  267  -  - 
France  3374  2025  1142  794  423  254  198  185 
Source: Maddison (2007 p.104) 
 
Table 2.2:  Real GDP per Capita (US$) for Developing Economies 1700-1980 
Country  1980  1965  1950  1913  1870  1820  1760  1700 
Brazil  1113  479  309  169  101  97  -  - 
China  404  224  127  149  118  118  -  - 
India  235  186  152  159  123  123  -  - 
Mexico  643  427  282  143  110  112  -  - 
Source: Maddison (2007 p.104) 
 
From  1870,  developed  and  developing  countries  experienced  rapid  economic  growth.  The 
United States experienced a real GDP per capita increase of 137% between the years 1870 to 
1913. The United Kingdom grew 53% in addition to France’s 83% over that same time period 
(Maddison, 2007). Comparing this data to Table 2.2 there is still significant growth exhibited 6  
 
from developing countries such as China, India and Mexico; however real GDP per capita is 
significantly smaller (Maddison, 2001b and 2007). 
2.3:  Factors Contributing to Economic Growth 
 
Maddison (2007) attempted to identify the causes of such growth observed in Table 2.1 and 
2.2. There are three main factors being; capital deepening policies, labour productivity and the 
degree of openness (Maddison, 1987; 2001a; 2001b and 2007). Maddison (2007) identified 
these  factors  as  having  contributed  to  disparities  between  the  developed  and  developing 
countries (Maddison, 1982; 1987; 2001a and 2007). 
2.3.1:  Capital Deepening: 
 
Capital deepening refers to an increasing amount of capital per worker. According to evidence 
by Maddison (2007), economies that have invested in a capital deepening policy appear to be 
the  most  productive  and  wealthiest  in  terms  of  real  GDP  per  capita.  Table  2.3  and  2.4 
demonstrates this capital deepening effect (Maddison, 2007). 7  
 
Table 2.3:  Gross Stock of Machinery and Equipment per Capita (US$1990) 
Country  2003  1973  1950  1913  1870  1820 
United 
Kingdom 
14291  6203  2122  878  334  92 
United States  32240  10762  6110  2749  489  87 
Japan  31232  6431  1381  329  94  n/a 
Source: Maddison (2007 p.306) 
 
Table 2.4:  Gross Stock of Non-Residential Structures per Capita (US$1990) 
Country  2003  1973  1950  1913  1870  1820 
United 
Kingdom 
22957  9585  3412  3215  2509  1074 
United States  35687  24366  17211  14696  3686  1094 
Japan  52589  12778  1929  852  593  n/a 
Source: Maddison (2007 p.306) 
 
The United Kingdom and the United States experienced significant growth in their stock of 
physical  capital  and  non-residential  structures per  capita.  This represents  significant  capital 
deepening since there is a growing number of machinery and equipment available for each 
worker (Maddison, 1995a; 2001a and 2007). 8  
 
2.3.2:  Labour Productivity 
 
The growth in labour productivity from 1820-2003 indicates a greater proportion of GDP per 
hour worked. This equates to higher quality of labour inputs. This is partly due to the amount of 
machinery  and  equipment  per  capita  (Maddison,  1995a  and  2007).  However  labour  inputs 
increase productivity through the human capital factor. Formal education and training derives 
greater dexterity and greater efficiency in operating sophisticated capital. The productivity of 
labour inputs is demonstrated below in table 2.5. 
Table 2.5:  GDP per Hour Worked (US$1990) 
Country  2003  1973  1950  1913  1870  1820 
United 
Kingdom 
30.69  15.97  7.93  4.31  2.55  1.49 
United States  38.92  23.72  12.65  5.12  2.25  1.30 
Japan  24.86  11.57  2.08  1.08  0.46  0.42 
Source: Maddison (2007 p.305) 
 
Development of human capital in Maddison (2007) is measured by the number of years of 
formal education for those in employment. This implies that labour is more capable of following 
complex  production  processes  as  a  result  of  formal  education.  According  to  Maddison  the 
education levels rose eight-fold in the United Kingdom and eleven-fold in the United States and 
Japan. Japan in the 1820s was lagging significantly behind the United Kingdom and the United 
states with US$0.42 of GDP per hour worked compared to US$1.49 and $US1.30 respectively 
(Maddison, 2001a; 2001b and 2007). However the institutionalisation of innovation and growth 9  
 
in secular knowledge through universities increased the quality of the human capital in all three 
economies  (Maddison,  1989;  1991  and  2007).  Maddison  (2007)  shows  both  the  United 
Kingdom and the United States exhibiting a twenty-fold and thirty-fold increase in GDP per hour 
worked. 
The level of education in Japan grew eleven-fold, the same pace as the United States albeit at 
different  time  periods.  From  Table  2.5,  Japan’s  GDP  per  hours  worked  surged  from  1913 
compared to the United Kingdom and the United States where this occurred nearly 100 years 
earlier in 1820s (Maddison, 2007). 
2.3.3:  Degree of Openness 
 
The degree of openness relates to the importance of international trade. International trade 
represented the first form of globalisation and was critical in supplying most of Western Europe 
and the United Kingdom with new products such as tea, coffee, cacao, sugar potatoes silk and 
textiles (Smith, 1776 and Maddison, 1983; 1989 and 2007). Table 2.6 revealed that developed 
economies such as the United Kingdom and the United States engaged in regular international 
trade described by Smith (1776) as he stressed the importance of foreign commerce and the 
valuable trading opportunities for economic growth. One proxy for the degree of openness is 
exports per capita (Smith, 1776). 10  
 
Table 2.6:  Exports per Capita (US$1990) 
Country  2003  1973  1950  1913  1870  1820 
United 
Kingdom 
5342  1684  781  862  390  53 
United States  2762  824  283  197  62  25 
Japan  3152  875  42  33  2  0 
Source: Maddison (2007 p.305) 
 
Maddison measures the degree of openness by the amount of exports in US$ per capita. The 
United Kingdom was the most active in terms of international trade with US$53 of exports per 
capita (Maddison, 1987 and 2007). The ratio of exports to GDP rose from 3% to 25% from 1820 
to 2003 followed closely by the United States with US$25 of exports per capita. Japan remained 
virtually a closed economy from the 1820s through to the 1870s (Maddison, 1989 and 2007). 
Japan is regarded as the developing world’s success story and from 1820-1870 where exports 
per capita remained virtually nil the amount of capital and equipment available per capita was 
subsequently  very  low  at  US$94.  During  the  1950s  and  beyond,  the  Japanese  economy 
increased their degree of openness and the exports per capita rose from US$42 to US$3152 
(Maddison,  1987  and  2007).  International  trade  and  globalisation  during  this  time  clearly 
benefited open economies with large exports per capita. This was a crucial component of the 
advancement of the Japanese economy. Economic growth occurs through the valuable trading 
opportunities and specialisation derived from international trade. This is demonstrated by the 
United  Kingdom,  United  States  and  Japan  all  of  which  relied  on  international  trade  and 
openness to stimulate economic growth (Maddison, 1982 and 2007). 11  
 
2.4:  Conclusion 
 
Chapter 2 discussed the brief history and progress of economic growth. The main objective was 
to examine the economic growth of developed economies and attempt to examine the cause of 
rapid development. Maddison (2007) suggested three contributing factors: capital deepening, 
labour productivity and degree of openness. It was established that government policies to 
invest into more capital per worker had a positive impact on the United States, United Kingdom 
and Japanese economy (Maddison, 1982; 1989; 2001a and 2007). Secondly labour productivity 
through formal education allowed the labour force in these economies to generate more GDP 
for each hour worked since they possessed a greater level of human capital (Maddison, 1983 
and 2007). Finally the degree of openness allowed rapid growth through international trade via 
international  trading  routes  (Maddison,  2007  and  Smith,  1776).  Chapter  2  offered  a  broad 
insight into historical economic growth. Chapter 3 which follows will analyse economic growth 
formally using the Neoclassical Growth Model. 12  
 
CHAPTER 3: THE NEOCLASSICAL GROWTH MODEL 
 
3.1:  Introduction 
 
This chapter has two aims; the first is to highlight the theory of capital and to discuss the 
shortcomings from capital accumulation. The second aim is to explore in detail the mechanics 
behind the Neoclassical Growth Model and its underlying assumptions. This chapter carefully 
analyses Solow (1956) and establishes a methodological framework. This chapter is critical to 
the thesis because the methodology described here is used to estimate TFP in the forthcoming 
chapter five. 
3.2:  The Theory of Capital 
 
The accumulation of capital spans back hundreds of years before modern civilisation. It was 
common practice to hoard precious metals and other forms of capital for national interests. 
Capital extends the workers ability to perform tasks as described by Smith (1776, p.5): 
The great increase in the quantity of work by man is the consequence of the invention of a great 
number of machines which facilitates and abridge labour, and enable one man to do the work 
of many. 
 
Smith outlined that capital has the ability to increase the productivity of labour. Table 2.3 
highlights that where economies invest into capital per capita, rapid development occurred 
(Maddison, 1984 and 2007). Although capital extends the workers ability to perform tasks, 
capital accumulation will not inspire long lasting and sustainable economic growth due to the 
diminishing properties of capital (Solow, 1956 and Swan, 1956). There remains a continuous 13  
 
need for technological advancement for economic growth to continue in the long run to offset 
the depreciation of capital (Solow, 1956 and Swan, 1956). Solow (1956) proved this concept 
through the Neoclassical Growth Model. 
 
3.3:  The Mechanics of the Neoclassical Growth Model 
 
Solow (1956) addressed the weakness of the Harrod-Domar Model. Solow argued that the 
condition  of  fixed  proportions  of  production  lacked  the  ability  for  labour  and  capital 
substitutions to occur (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956; Jorgenson and Griliches, 1967 and Denison, 
1962). Solow suggested that the assumption of fixed proportions to be inaccurate. He argued 
that the system responded to varying degrees of capital and labour substitutions. In response 
to this, Solow developed the Neoclassical Growth Model (Solow, 1956 and Swan, 1956). The 
Neoclassical Growth Model is less rigid than the Harrod-Domar model. The Neoclassical Growth 
Model can be summarised into a production function outlined in equation 3.1 below. 
 
(3.1) 
Equation 3.1 describes output (Yt) as a function of two factors of production being capital (K) 
and labour (L) with an additional variable to capture any unexplained residual being termed as 
technological progress (A) with (t) representing time. This production function is based on five 
critical assumptions (Solow, 1956 and Swan, 1956). 
Yt = F (Kt , At , Lt) 
 14  
 
3.3.1:  The First Assumption 
 
The  first  assumption  in  the  Neoclassical  Growth  Model  assumes  the  labour  force  and 
technology grow at a constant rate. This assumption is illustrated in equations 3.2 and 3.3. 
 
(3.2) 
 
(3.3) 
Equation 3.2 describes the rate of growth in the labour force being (1+n)
t. Similarily equation 
3.3 describes the constant growth of technology as (1+g)
t (Solow, 1956 and Swan, 1956). The 
rate of growth in the labour force described by Solow can be demonstrated graphically in figure 
3.1. 
L(t) = L0 (1+n)
t 
A(t) = A0 (1+g)
t 15  
 
Figure 3.1:  Perfectly Inelastic Labour Supply Curve 
 
                                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Solow (1956, p. 67) 
 
In figure 3.1 the vertical curves indicate full employment
1. These curves are dynamic and shift 
to the right due to population growth. As the labour force increases over  time the curve in 
figure 3.1 shifts rightward from L0 to L’0 and to L’’0. To ensure perfect inelasticity, the system 
adjusts real wage rates to a level which results in full employment (Solow, 1956 and Swan, 
1956). As a result there is a varying degree of subsistence relative to the level of real wages. 
 
                                                      
1 Figure 3.1 is a graphical representation of equation 3.2 described in (Solow, 1956). 
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3.3.2:  The Second Assumption 
 
The  second  assumption  states  that  the  marginal  products  are  positive  and  is  expressed  in 
equation 3.4. 
 
(3.4) 
Equation 3.4 is the same fundamental assumption which defined the Harrod-Domar model. The 
first derivative yields positive returns greater than zero and is represented in figure 3.2 as a 
positive linear function. (Solow, 1956 and Swan, 1956). 
 
Figure 3.2:  Positive Marginal Products 
 
                
 
 
 
 
                         
Source: Solow (1956, p.71) 
K (t) 
FK , FL >0 
FK’ 
L (t) 
FL’  FL 
FK 
FK , FL > 0 17  
 
In figure 3.2 each additional increment of capital and labour generates an additional positive 
flow of output
2. When  FK equals FL any additional injections of labour or capital shifts the 
economy to FK’ FL’. The shift in factors is referred to as factor accumulation and is the source of 
economic growth in countries such as China and Russia (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956; Krugman, 
1981 and 1994). However in assumption three Solow (1956) incorporated an important feature 
into the Neoclassical Growth Model. Solow (1956) described the diminishing aspect of capital 
and the subsequent decline in economic growth which occurs from factor accumulation (Solow, 
1956 and Swan, 1956). 
 
3.3.3:  The Third Assumption 
 
The  third  assumption  describes  that  marginal  productivities  of  capital  and  labour  are 
diminishing. Mathematically to derive the productivities of capital and labour,  these factors 
need to be differentiated a second time (Solow, 1956 and Swan, 1956). This is expressed in 
equation 3.5. 
 
(3.5) 
Equation 3.5 illustrates that each successive injection of capital and labour has a diminishing 
effect  on  productivity.  This  is  demonstrated  by  FKK  and  FLL  representing  the  diminishing 
productivities of capital and labour (Solow, 1956 and Swan, 1956). This is depicted in figure 3.3 
and the curvature is derived logically in equation 3.5 since the second derivative is negative. 
                                                      
2 Figure 3.2 is a graphical representation of equation 3.4 described in (Solow, 1956). 
FKK , FLL < 0 18  
 
Equation 3.5 dictates that factor accumulation cannot grow indefinitely as the rate of increase 
is reducing with respect to time. (Solow, 1956 and Swan, 1956). 
 
Figure 3.3:  Diminishing Marginal Productivities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Solow (1956, p.70) 
 
3.3.4:  The Fourth Assumption 
 
The fourth assumption assumes constant returns to scale and this is denoted by π in equation 
3.6 acting as a constant coefficient to Y, K, A and L (Solow, 1956 and Swan, 1956). 
 
(3.6) 
K (t) 
FKK , FLL <0 
FKK
’ 
 
FKK 
L (t)  FLL’ 
 
FLL 
πYt = F (πKt , πAt , Lt)  where π > 0 19  
 
By substituting π = *1/AL] into equation 3.6 this can be simplified to form equation 3.7 and thus 
expressing the function in per capita format. 
  
(3.7) 
where [Y/AL] represents output per labour input; 
and [K/AL]  denotes capital per labour input. 
In summary assumption four established that output per labour input is a function of capital 
per labour input (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956 and Taylor, 2007). 
 
3.3.5:  The Fifth Assumption 
 
The  fifth  assumption  assumes  a  constant  proportion  of  Y  to  be  invested.  A  single  unit  of 
investment into Y yields an additional unit of new capital. This is adjusted for any existing 
capital depreciation represented by δ (Solow, 1956, Swan, 1956 and Taylor, 2007). 
 
 
(3.8) 
Equation 3.8 describes that capital investments is equal to the change of capital differentiated 
with respect to time. This derives the rate of change of capital to equal the fraction of Y that is 
devoted  to  investments  minus  deprecation  (δ)  of  capital.  In  addition,  by  amalgamating 
equations  3.2  and  3.3  which  describes  the  constant  growth  rate  of  the  labour  force  and 
[Y/AL] = f [K/AL]   : 
K’t = [∆K/∆t] = sYt - δKt 20  
 
technology with equation 3.9 this yields equation 3.10 (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956 and Taylor, 
2007). 
(3.9) 
 
 
(3.10) 
Equation 3.10 is the simplified version of equation 3.9. Equation 3.10 states that investments 
into capital per capita equates to the function of capital per capita whilst adding the constant 
rate of growth of both the labour force (n) and technological growth (g), after adjusting for 
deprecation of capital denoted by (δ) (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956 and Taylor, 2007). Figure 3.4 
below demonstrates the mechanics of the Neoclassical Growth Model graphically. 
 
3.3.6:  The Implications of Factor Accumulation on GDP Per Capita 
 
A serious implication from factor accumulation is diminishing returns to scale illustrated in 
figure 3.4. As Sf(k) exceeds (n+g+δ)k the capital to effective labour ratio is increasing where it 
reaches a natural steady state equilibrium at point k* y*.Likewise when Sf(k) is less than the 
(n+g+δ)k the capital to effective labour ratio is decreasing to this same equilibrium point. When 
the level of savings and growth in technology is high whilst population growth is low this widens 
the gap between the savings curve Sf(k) and the (n+g+δ)k curve. The gap between these two 
curves is represented by (C) and illustrates the increase in k and the subsequent increase in 
output (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956 and Taylor, 2007). 
*K’t / At Lt] = sf [Kt / At Lt] – δ[Kt/At Lt] 
k’t = sf (kt) – (δ+n+g)kt 
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Figure 3.4:  Dynamics of the Neoclassical Growth Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                           
Source: Taylor (2007, p.12) 
 
Focusing specifically on the capital accumulation from k* to k2* it is noted that at this point 
Sf(k)  is  less  than  (n+g+δ)k.  The  accumulation  of  capital  will  experience  diminishing  returns 
specified in assumption three. Where k>k*the steady-state equilibrium is (k* y*) which implies 
that  regardless  of  the  origin,  the  economy  is  on  a  dynamic  path  towards  steady-state 
equilibrium, upon which any continuous accumulation of capital will yield diminishing economic 
returns as demonstrated at point k2* y2* (Solow, 1956 and Swan, 1956). 
The  Neoclassical  Growth  Model  suggested  that  in  order  to  avoid  diminishing  returns,  an 
increase in the level of savings (s) will shift the investment curve from Sf(k) to the new S1f(k) 
and in this new scenario exceeds the (n+g+δ)k curve. At this level, k will continue to rise and so 
y 
S1f(k) 
Sf(k) 
(n+g+δ)k 
y* 
y1* 
 
y2* 
 
C 
k*  k1*  k2*  k 22  
 
too will output, rising to y1*. Since there is a larger amount of capital per capita, output per 
capita rises. The mobility of k is demonstrated in the movements along the curve from k* y* to 
k1* y1* being the new steady-state. Movements between these two steady-state equilibriums 
highlights that a permanent increase in the savings rate only exhibits a temporary increase in 
the growth rate of output per worker (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956 and Taylor, 2007). A change in 
the savings rate will only have a level effect due to assumption three denoting FKK ,FLL < 0. For a 
growth  effect  a  positive  change  in  the  rate  of  technological  progress  is  essential.  The 
Neoclassical Growth Model exogenously deals with the notion of technological progress as a 
residual represented by (A) which forms a proxy for Total Factor Productivity (Solow, 1956; 
Swan, 1956 and Taylor, 2007). The Neoclassical Growth Model is expressed as follows: 
 
(3.11) 
The alpha (α) value in equation 3.11 denotes the capital share and the (β) value denotes labour 
share in the production function. Solow (1956; Swan, 1956 and Taylor, 2007 ) demonstrated 
that capital will follow a path of diminishing returns in figure 3.3 and therefore accumulating 
capital stock will not result in long term economic growth. Solow (1956) described that only TFP 
will provide a growth effect and factor inputs contributing to only a level effect. The South East 
Asian economies experienced economic growth derived from the accumulation of capital stock 
(Krugman,  1979;  1981;  1991a;  1991b;  1994  and  Kim  and  Lau,  1994).  These  economies 
experienced rapid growth in inputs towards the steady-state where diminishing returns sets in. 
Krugman (1994, p.40) stated: 
Y= A (K
α, L
β)  where α+β =1 23  
 
The newly industrialising countries of Asia, like the Soviet Union of the 1950s, have achieved 
rapid  growth  in  large  part  through  an  astonishing  mobilization  of  resources.  Once  one 
accounts for the role of rapidly growing inputs in these countries’ growth, one finds little left 
to explain. Asian Growth, like that of the Soviet Union in its high-growth era, seems to be 
driven  by  extraordinary  growth  in  inputs  like  labour  and  capital  rather  than  by  gains  in 
efficiency. 
 
Solow (1957) used data from the United States to estimate the TFP from 1909-1949 based on 
the methodology established earlier in Solow (1956). This will be discussed further in the 
following section. 
 
3.4:  Empirical Application of the Neoclassical Growth Model 
 
Solow (1957) estimated Total Factor Productivity by rearranging equation 3.11 to express the 
function in terms of technical progress. By using the Neoclassical Growth Model, empirical 
estimations like the one featured in the thesis is made possible (Solow, 1957). In equation 3.12 
the function has been expressed to represent the percentage change in TFP (â) as a function of 
the estimates of output (ý) capital (ḱ) and labour (ĺ) where α+β =1 (Solow, 1957). 
 
 
(3.12) 
By assuming â as the proxy for TFP growth, Solow aims to capture any kind of shift in the 
production function explainable by improvements in education, higher quality labour force and 
increased productivity. When applying this methodology to the USA from 1909-1949 Solow 
â =ý-ḱ 
α ĺ 
β 
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strived to find the purest and cleanest estimates for output per unit of labour, capital per unit 
of labour, and the share of capital (
α) (Solow, 1956; Solow, 1957 and Swan, 1956). Solow’s 
estimates are detailed below. 
3.4.1:  Output per unit of Labour 
 
When measuring estimated output (ý), the Real Net National Product (RNNP) proved to be the 
most valuable since it represents monetary value of finished goods and services produced by 
that economy which is adjusted for depreciation. Depreciation measures the amount of Gross 
National Product that must be spent on new capital goods to maintain the existing physical 
capital stock (Solow, 1957). Thus the Real Net National Product is the amount of goods in a 
given year which can be consumed without reducing future consumption after correcting for 
inflation (Solow, 1956; Solow, 1957 and Swan, 1956). Theoretically, Solow identified the RNNP 
as the purist measure for output. However due to the rarity of data Gross National Product was 
sufficient  with  the  intention  of  including  depreciation  in  the  share  of  capital.  Solow  also 
restricted the experiment to non-farm economic activity for two main reasons (Solow, 1956; 
1957 and Swan, 1956). Firstly it avoided the complications in computing the government output 
and also in the interest of homogeneity agricultural production is excluded. Therefore Solow’s 
proxy for output is described by the real private non-farm GNP per man hour (Solow, 1957). 
3.4.2:  Capital per Unit of Labour 
 
The  ideal  measure  of  capital  in  an  economy  is  the  annual  flow  of  capital  services.  This  is 
because by accurately identifying the direct real impact capital has on the economy it becomes 25  
 
easier to determine the extent capital has contributed to the production in the economy for the 
respective  time  period.  Solow  described  some  conceptual  problems  when  attempting  to 
determine  factor  prices  for  capital  (Solow,  1956;  Solow,  1957  and  Swan,  1956).  When  a 
machine reaches the end point in its useable life, the productive capacity reaches zero. A newer 
vintage  of  machine  of  similar  capabilities  are  installed.  Naturally  the  efficiency  of  the  new 
capital will increase output; however the overall maximum flow of capital services remains 
constant (Solow, 1957).  
Solow (1957) excluded idle capacity as it is capital in use, not capital in place which contributes 
to production. Solow estimated the utilisation of capital by reducing capital by the percentage 
of unemployed labour force. The main assumption in place here is that labour force and capital 
always  suffer  similar  unemployment  rates  (Solow,  1957).  This  assumption  provides  a  more 
accurate representation of the aggregation of capital than making no attempt of correction for 
idle  capacity.  Solow  (1957)  used  the  Goldsmith  dataset  which  outlines  capital  stock  whilst 
eliminating government, agricultural and consumer durables and correcting for idle capacity 
(Solow, 1957). 26  
 
3.4.3:  Share of Capital 
 
In  Solow’s  empirical  estimates,  the  data  relating  to  the  share  of  capital  was  derived  from 
various  sources  including  the  contributions  made  by  Professor  Gale  Johnson.  According  to 
Johnson approximately 35% of non-farm entrepreneurial income is a return to property. Solow 
used Johnson’s estimates to approximate the share of capital denoted by (α). Solow (1957) 
estimated TFP by assigning 1909 as the base year so A(t+1)= A(t) and 1+ΔA(t)/A(t) would solve for 
A(t) from 1909-1949 (Solow, 1957). 
 
3.4.4:  Total Factor Productivity Growth for the USA from 1909-1949 
 
Table  3.1  documents  the  TFP  estimates  obtained  by  Solow  (1957).This  is  accompanied  by 
figures 3.5 and 3.6 which graphically illustrate the change in A (ΔA/A) and the growth of A(t) 
from 1909-1949 (Solow, 1957). 27  
 
Table 3.1:  Estimation of A(t) 
Year 
%Labour 
force 
employed  
(1) 
Capital 
stock 
($mil) 
 (2) 
Col.1*Col.
2 (3) 
Share of 
property 
in income 
(4) 
Priv. 
Nonfarm 
GNP per 
man-hour 
(5) 
Employed 
capital per 
man-hour 
(6) 
∆A/A 
 (7) 
A(t)  
(8) 
1909  91.1  146,142  133,135  0.335  0.623  2.06  -0.017  1.000 
1910  92.8  150,038  139,235  0.330  0.616 
 
2.10  0.039  0.983 
1911  90.6  156,355  141,640  0.335  0.647  2.17  0.002  1.021 
1912  93.0  159,971  148,773  0.330  0.652  2.21  0.040  1.023 
1913  91.8  164,504  151,015  0.334  0.680  2.23  0.007  1.064 
1914  83.6  171,513  143,385  0.325  0.682  2.20  -0.028  1.071 
1915  84.5  175,317  148,188  0.344  0.669  2.23  0.034  1.041 
1916  93.7  178,351  167,115  0.358  0.700  2.34  -0.010  1.076 
1917  94.0  182,263  171,327  0.370  0.679  2.21  0.072  1.065 
1918  94.5  186,679  176,412  0.342  0.729  2.22  0.032  1.142 
1919  93.1  189,977  176,869  0.354  0.767  2.47  0.011  1.157 
1920  92.8  194,802  180,776  0.319  0.721  2.58  0.016  1.069 
1921  76.9  201,491  154,947  0.369  0.770  2.55  0.032  1.146 
1922  81.7  204,324  166,933  0.339  0.788  2.49  0.011  1.183 
1923  92.1  209,964  193,377  0.337  0.809  2.61  0.016  1.196 
1924  88.0  222,113  195,460  0.330  0.836  2.74  0.032  1.215 
1925  91.1  231,772  211,198  0.336  0.872  2.81  -0.010  1.254 
1926  90.0  244,611  226,266  0.327  0.869  2.87  -0.005  1.241 
1927  92.5  259,142  233,228  0.323  0.871  2.93  -0.007  1.235 
1928  90.0  271,089  243,980  0.338  0.874  3.02  0.020  1.226 
1929  92.5  279,691  258,714  0.332  0.895  3.06  -0.043  1.251 
1930  88.1  289,291  254,865  0.347  0.880  3.30  0.024  1.197 
1931  78.2  289,056  226,042  0.325  0.904  3.33  0.023  1.226 
1932  67.9  282,731  191,974  0.397  0.879  3.28  0.011  1.198 
1933  66.5  270,676  180,000  0.362  0.869  3.10  0.072  1.211 
1934  70.9  262,370  186,020  0.355  0.921  3.00  0.039  1.298 
1935  73.0  257,810  188,201  0.351  0.943  2.87  0.059  1.349 
1936  77.3  254,875  197,018  0.357  0.982  2.72  -0.010  1.429 
1937  81.0  257,076  208,232  0.340  0.971  2.71  0.021  1.415 
1938  74.7  259,789  194,062  0.331  1.000  2.78  0.048  1.445 
1939  77.2  257,314  198,646  0.347  1.034  2.66  0.050  1.514 
1940  80.6  258,048  207,987  0.357  1.082  2.63  0.044  1.590 
1941  86.8  262,940  228,232  0.377  1.122  2.58  0.003  1.660 
1942  93.6  270,063  252,779  0.356  1.136  2.64  0.016  1.665 
1943  97.4  269,761  262,747  0.342  1.180  2.62  0.071  1.692 
1944  98.4  265,483  261,235  0.332  1.265  2.63  0.021  1.812 
1945  96.5  261,472  252,320  0.314  1.296  2.33  -0.044  1.850 
1946  94.8  258,051 
,472 
244,632  0.312  1.215  2.50  -0.017  1.769 
1947  95.4  268,845  256,478  0.327  1.194  2.50  0.016  1.739 
1948  95.7  276,476  264,588  0.332  1.221  2.55  0.024  1.767 
1949  93.0  269,105  269,105  0.326  1.275  2.70  ...  1.809 
Source: Solow (1957 p.315)28  
 
Figure 3.5:  Graphical representation of ΔA/A 
 
Source: Solow (1957 p.314) 
 
Figure 3.6:  Graphical representation of A(t) 
Source: Solow (1957 p. 314) 29  
 
As estimated in table 3.1, Solow’s results for TFP in the United States from 1909-1949 revealed 
some clear trends. The estimates suggest varying rates of technological progress (Solow, 1957). 
The  first  21  relative  shifts  from  1909-1929  produced  an  average  growth  in  technological 
progress of 0.90%.  Technological  progress  increased by  an  average  of  2.25%  from 1929 to 
1949
3. The surge and sudden fall from 1915-1919 and 1939-1945 coincided with World War 1 
and 2. Over the collective 40 year period output per man hour had approximately doubled  
(Solow, 1957). Solow (1957) noted that the cumulative upward shift in the production function 
was 80% with one-eight representing the change in c apital per man hour and the residual 
seven-eighths being attributed to the tremendous growth in techni cal progress (Solow, 1957). 
Solow demonstrated this growth in output since real GNP per man hour increased from $0.623 
in 1909 to $1.275 in 1949 (Solow, 1957). The result is $0.705 GNP per man hour once technical 
changed has been subtracted. Solow described the innovation that had taken place in the USA 
from 1909-1949 was due to growth in TFP rather than in the accumulation of capital  (Solow, 
1956 and Krugman, 1981 and 1994). 
                                                      
3 The higher the value of At , the higher the effectiveness of labour inputs and therefore the greater the level of output (Y). 30  
 
3.5:  Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated the theory of capital and the diminishing returns to scale from 
accumulating capital (Solow, 1956; 1957 and Swan, 1956). Solow (1956) described capital to 
only offer temporary growth in output which is unsustainable for long term economic growth 
(Solow, 1956; 1957 and Krugman, 1979 and 1984). In addition this chapter has established the 
methodological  framework  behind  the  Neoclassical  Growth  Model  documented  by  Solow 
(1956). To demonstrate this theory further Solow (1957) highlighted the importance of TFP on 
the  United  States  economy  (Solow,  1957).  In  his  findings  Solow  noted  that  approximately 
seven-eighths of the increase in the production function was attributed to TFP growth from 
1909-1949  in  the  United  States  (Solow,  1957).  This  chapter  is  pivotal  to  the  thesis  as  the 
methodology adopted by Solow (1956 and 1957) forms the foundation for the estimation of 
TFP featuring in Chapter 5. Chapter 4 which follows  offers a comprehensive review of the 
literature regarding the Neoclassical Growth Model. 31  
 
CHAPTER 4: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
4.1:  Introduction 
 
This chapter has two aims; the first is to explore the literature relating to the Neoclassical 
Growth  Model.  This  chapter  introduces  the  Cambridge  Controversy  as  a  response  to  the 
aggregation of capital technique adopted by Solow (1956 and 1957). Secondly this chapter will 
discuss  the  shortcomings  of  the  Neoclassical  Growth  Model  put  forward  by  the  Keynesian 
School of Thought. This chapter reviews the literature of Kaldor’s (1960) Technical Progress 
Function and the Salter (1966) Model. In addition Arrow (1962) and Shell (1966) will be further 
discussed. 
 
4.2:  The Cambridge Controversy 
 
To estimate TFP using the Neoclassical Growth Model, Solow (1956) aggregated factor prices 
including capital and labour to derive TFP. There are some limitations from aggregating factor 
prices: firstly there is ambiguity when measuring capital compared  to labour (Solow, 1956; 
1957; Swan 1956 and Taylor 2007). Labour is a non-homogenous input meaning that the level 
of labour inputs and skill levels between individuals can vary dramatically (Robinson, 1971). 
Labour is measureable in both a physical and technical unit being the number of man-hours of 
work or through wages and employment figures (Robinson, 1962 and 1971). These units of 
measure are critical in determining a factor price for labour. Solow (1956) determined a factor 
price for capital from aggregation techniques. This concerned Robinson who outlined that the 32  
 
aggregation of capital stock was very ambiguous with respect to deterring factor prices for 
capital  (Solow,  1956).  Harcourt  (1972)  offers  a  comprehensive  account  of  the  literature 
regarding the Cambridge Controversy. Harcourt described Robinson’s initial complaints with 
the  neoclassical  approach  to  the  capital  variable.  Robinson’s  main  issue  was  the  way  neo-
classicals explained the distribution of income from profit earners and wage earner and how 
capital, labour and knowledge of one could be substituted for the other by their respective 
marginal productivities (Harcourt, 1972 and 1976). Harcourt described Robinson’s attempts to 
find a unit for capital such as an index which is independent of relative prices and distribution. 
This unit should be measureable alongside labour in a production function to explain national 
output (Harcourt, 1972 and 1976). In addition Hunt (1979) summarised the capital aggregation 
debate by commenting on the meaning of labour and the ambiguity of capital. Hunt (1979, 
p.400) stated that: 
While it is perfectly clear what we mean when we aggregate the amount of labour employed 
(in order to ascertain its marginal productivity), it is by no means clear what we mean when 
we aggregate capital. If we say 100 labourers work for a week, the meaning is unambiguous. 
But what does it mean to say 100 capitals worked for one week? One hundred factories? Of 
various sizes? One hundred shovels? 50 factories and 25 shovels and 25 oil refining plants? 
This is obviously nonsensical. One piece of capital can be anything ranging from a screwdriver 
to a gigantic plant that employs tens of thousands of workers. 
 
Granger (1997) argued that reducing the complexities of capital to a simple aggregated number 
is  an  over  simplistic  approach  since  the  actual  economy  is  complex  with  millions  on  non-
identical and non-independent decision making units (Taylor, 2007; Granger, 1997 and Hunt, 
1979). 33  
 
The Cambridge Controversy also revealed that time was ignored in the Neoclassical Growth 
Model (Harcourt, 1972; 1976 and Taylor, 2007). Robinson (1980) stated that the neoclassical 
analysis of capital was static and that if decisions are introduced into the model then time must 
also be introduced (Robinson, 1980). Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) argued that a single value of 
capital stock (Kt), labour (Lt) and output (Yt) does not exist since everything is dependent on the 
past.  Robinson  (1980)  discussed  the  importance  of  time,  this  explains  Kaldor’s  Technical 
Production Function Curve and the Salter Model (Kaldor and Mirrlees, 1962 and Robinson, 
1980). 
 
4.3:  The Kaldorian Technical Progress Function  
 
Kaldor  and  Mirrlees  avoided  the  ambiguity  of  measuring  capital  stock  by  considering 
obsolescence. Over time the profitability of the capital stock must diminish as newer vintages of 
capital are produced thus making the existing vintages obsolete (Kaldor and Mirrlees, 1962). 
Kaldor (1960) developed the Technical Progress Function as an alternative approach to the 
Neoclassical Growth Model to explain the process of economic growth. Kaldor challenged the 
Neoclassical  Growth  Model  which  described  the  accumulation  of  capital  stock  as  non 
sustainable due to its diminishing marginal productivities demonstrated in figure 3.3 (Kaldor, 
1960 and 1968). Alternatively Kaldor (1960) described in his Technical Progress Function that 
capital accumulation actually induces economic growth. Kaldor noted that technical progress is 
diffused into the economy through the creation of new equipment (Kaldor, 1960; 1968 and 
Kaldor and Mirrlees, 1962). Figure 4.1 illustrates Kaldor’s Technical Progress Function. 34  
 
Figure 4.1:  Technical Progress Function 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   
                   
                   
                   
             
                   
                   
 
Source: Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962, p 176.) 
 
The Technical Progress Function slopes upward suggesting that as the rate of growth of capital 
per capita (k’/k) increases; the rate of change of output per worker (y’/y) also increases at a 
constant rate. The TT’ Curve reflects the magnitude of the technological progress with series of 
new innovations causing shifts along the TT’ Curve from (k, y) to the steady-state equilibrium 
(P)  (Kaldor,  1957;  1960;  Kaldor  and  Mirrlees,  1962  and  Taylor,  2007).  Kaldor  and  Mirrlees 
described that technological progress is driven by the rate of newly produced capital goods and 
therefore suggesting that capital accumulation yields positive effects on output (Kaldor and 
Mirrlees, 1962). By reducing the amount of obsolete capital equipment this creates a capital 
deepening  effect  by  replacing  outdated  capital.  The  replacement  of  obsolete  capital 
T 
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accommodates the newer and more productive capital. Kaldor and Mirrlees extend their view 
by  suggesting  that the operative  lifespan  of  capital  equipment  is  affected  by  obsolescence 
(Kaldor and Mirrlees, 1962). Thus the rate of productivity growth or technological progress is 
determined by the capital to output ratio on new capital. Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962, p.175) 
stated that technological progress: 
...is infused into the economic system through the creation of new equipment, which depends 
on the current investment expenditure. Hence the technical progress function has been re-
defined so as to exhibit a relationship between the rate of change of gross investment per 
operative and the rate of increase in labour productivity on newly installed equipment. 
 
The faster older vintages of capital equipment are retired; this accelerates the replacement of 
capital  that  is  embodied  with  newer  technological  capabilities  and  innovations.  This  is  the 
solution to increasing productivity rather than attempts to reduce the amount of workers in 
relation to the existing capital equipment (Kaldor and Mirrlees, 1962; Kaldor, 1960 and Taylor, 
2007). Growth in productivity is governed by the amount of capital equipment available per 
worker where Kaldor concluded with three propositions (Kaldor, 1966). 36  
 
4.3.1:  Kaldor’s Three Propositions 
 
Kaldor proposed that the growth in the manufacturing sector achieved by investments into 
capital will increase GDP. Secondly Kaldor suggested that the rate of growth of manufacturing 
output will determine the rate of growth of labour productivity in the manufacturing sector 
resulting in constant or increasing returns to scale. Finally the third proposition stated that the 
faster the rate of growth of manufacturing output, the faster the rate of transferences of labour 
from other sectors which are subjected to diminishing returns (Kaldor, 1966). As a result of the 
increasing  returns  in  the  manufacturing  sector  from  productivity  growth  Kaldor  noted  a 
relationship. That is the faster the rate of growth of manufacturing output, the faster the rate 
of growth of productivity in the economy as a whole (Kaldor, 1966 and Taylor, 2007). Kaldor 
(1966) described that productivity growth in the manufacturing sector is an increasing function 
of aggregate output growth since activities in manufacturing have increasing returns (Kaldor 
1966 and Taylor 2007). In addition activities in the primary sector are linked to diminishing 
returns  and  by  ignoring  the  manufacturing  sector  economies  risk  lower  technical  progress 
(Kaldor, 1966 and Taylor, 2007). 37  
 
4.4:  The Salter Model 
 
In Salter’s PhD dissertation he offered a similar view to Kaldor and Mirrlees. Salter suggested 
that replacing retired old capital with new capital also brings about technical progress. This is 
through the flow of new ideas and knowledge between various time periods as workers are 
able to grasp and use capital and new innovative equipment more efficiently (Salter, 1966 and 
Sato,  1966).  Thus  output  is  driven  by  capital  accumulation  over  time  as  new  ideas  and 
knowledge flow from each time period (Salter, 1966). This is demonstrated in figure 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.2:  The Salter Model 
 
 
 
 
In figure 4.2, output (Y) equals a function of factor inputs represented by (a,b,c) over (n) time 
periods.  Thus  for  continuous  productivity  growth,  increasing the  rate  of  investment  or  the 
replacement of capital will increase the rate and utilisation of the new production methods 
achieved  from  flows  of  innovation  from  the  previous  time  period  (Salter,  1966).  Salter 
described that rapid investment into the replacement of capital, yields greater spill-over effects 
including increased knowledge and the utilisation of new production techniques demonstrated 
in figure 4.2 and summarised below by Salter (1966, p. 72): 
 
Y = fn (a,b,c...) , Y= f n+1 (a,b,c ...) , ... Y = fn+t (a,b,c ...) , Y = fn (a,b,c ...) ... 
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all  investments,  net  investments  and  replacement  investment,  is  important  in  economic 
growth. An increasing supply of real gross investments per worker allows progress on two 
frontiers: The mechanisation frontier as best-practice techniques become progressively more 
mechanized  and  the  obsolescence  frontier  as  the  gap  between  co-existing  techniques  is 
steadily narrowed. 
Furthermore, Salter (1966, p.5) stated: 
Techniques  of  production  change  through  time  for  two  reasons:  improving  technical 
knowledge and changing factors prices. Both are continuous processes in time and together 
give rise to a stream of new techniques, each following the other in quick succession. The 
‘once-over’ analysis of comparative statics is only appropriate to change in techniques which 
are sufficiently great to displace completely all pre-existing methods before they themselves 
are displaced… Moreover, factor prices change slowly but continuously through time, and this 
alone is sufficient to produce a constant stream of new techniques of production. 
 
The Salter model described the importance of capital accumulation to drive output. According 
to Salter (1966) the evolution of new ideas over the n
th period allows for new technology and 
knowledge  embodied  inside  the  incumbent  capital  to  diffuse  through  the  economy.  The 
accumulation of capital according to Salter (1966) has the ability to assist economic growth 
(Salter,  1966).  The  aim  of  the  following  section  is  to  provide  commentaries  addressing 
deficiencies in the Neoclassical Growth Model. This provides a robust literature review for the 
thesis. 39  
 
4.5:  Learning-By-Doing 
 
Arrow  (1962)  attempted  to  remedy  the  deficiency  of  the  Neoclassical  Growth  Model.  He 
examined  the  concept  of  spill-over’s  and  learning-by-doing.  This  concept  was  explored  by 
Arrow  (1962)  where  he  noted  learning-by-doing  through  investment  activities  drove 
technological progress (Arrow, 1962). The knowledge gained in the investment activities had 
subsequent spill-over effects for the greater economy. Arrow stated that these spill-over effects 
reduced the need for assumption three in the Neoclassical Growth Model which describes each 
successive  injection  of  capital  and  labour  yields  decreasing  marginal  productivities.  Arrow 
suggested that the spill-over of knowledge from learning-by-doing means that both capital and 
labour will continue to receive its positive marginal products (Arrow, 1962). 
Arrow explained that technological progress can be accounted for since firms increase the stock 
of  knowledge  after  each  successive  time  periods  and  also  from  experiences  by  others. 
Therefore  an  investment  into  the  capital  stock  has  an  increasing  effect  on  the  stock  of 
knowledge in the subsequent time period. This leads to greater economic productivity and thus 
greater per capita income. The main difference is the way technological progress is considered. 
Arrow’s framework considered the production function of Solow but endogenised technological 
progress (A) with respects to learning- by-doing (Arrow, 1962). 
Arrow observed that learning-by-doing allows labour to make full and productive use of capital. 
Without a continuous process of learning through repetition, training and education it cannot 
be expected that the worker is able to fully make use of new and highly innovative capital 40  
 
produced through investments in the previous time period (Arrow, 1962 and Shultz, 1961). This 
concept is demonstrated in equation 4.1. 
 
 
(4.1) 
Arrow described that the rate of change of technological progress depended on how efficiently 
labour utilises capital represented by the capital to labour ratio. Arrow noted that instead of 
considering  investments  into  capital  to  be  the  engine  of  technical  progress,  investments 
represented the source from which new ideas and learning-by-doing emanates from. (Arrow, 
1962 and Taylor, 2007). Arrow therefore concludes that the productivity of labour increases 
with experience and experience is a function of the accumulation of investments which alters 
the labour environment. The firm’s accumulation of newer vintages of capital has produced a 
positive learning-by-doing effect (Arrow, 1962 and Taylor, 2007). 
 
Equation  4.2  describes  output  to  be  a  function  of  capital  and  labour,  however  Arrow 
endogenised technological progress into labour which exhibits constant returns since alpha and 
beta sums to unity. 
 
 
(4.2) 
Amalgamating equation 4.1 and 4.2 together gives equation 4.3 (Arrow, 1962). 
A’ = A (K/L)
 β 
 
Yt = (Kt)
α (At Lt)
1-α  where α+β =1 
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(4.3) 
Equation 4.3 illustrates that there is a proportional relationship between output and capital 
since knowledge automatically increases in proportion (Arrow, 1962). Thus Arrow’s learning-by-
doing framework can be graphically represented in figure 4.3
4. 
 
Figure 4.3:  The (AK) Model 
 
                
 
 
 
 
                         
                   
           
     
   
Source: Arrow (1962 p. 157)                   
                               
                                                      
4 Y=AK where Y is output, A is a constant and K is physical capital augmented by human capital which prevents diminishing returns from setting 
in. 
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The propensity for positive growth effects in figure 4.3 is summarised by Smith (1776, p.12) 
where learning-by-doing: 
...improves dexterity, and saves time. Each individual becomes more expert in his own peculiar 
branch,  more  work  is  done  upon  the  whole,  and  the  quantity  of  science  is  considerably 
increased by it. 
 
4.6:  The Shell Model 
 
Shell (1966) contributed to a revised and more descriptive way of describing economic progress 
and thus aiming to address the deficiencies of the Neoclassical Growth Model. The implications 
of capital accumulation and population growth have been explored in-depth by Solow (1956). 
However Shell (1966, p.63) introduced an inventive way of describing technological progress 
where he stated: 
Increases  in  technical  knowledge  are  fundamentally  related  to  the  amount  of  resources 
explicitly devoted to inventive activities. 
 
Shell stated that both Kaldor and Arrow introduced technical change as a continuous secular 
shift in the aggregate production function (Shell, 1966). In Kaldor’s Technical Progress Function 
there  is  a  positive  relationship  between  relative  change  in  per  capita  productivity  and  the 
relative change in gross investments. The implementation of these new techniques requires 
new capital equipment leading to increased productivity which is transmittable through new 
gross investments which drives the Technical Progress Function along the curve. According to 
Shell’s  interpretation  of  Kaldor,  higher  relative  rate  of  gross  investments  leads  to  greater 43  
 
technical dynamism allowing for newer vintages of capital to be created over time (Shell, 1966). 
Secondly  in  Arrow’s  model  he  focused  on  the  inherent  relationship  between  learning  and 
experience.  By  considering  Kaldor’s  model  Arrow  postulated  that  per  capita  productivity  is 
determined through the accumulation of gross investments. In Arrow’s model the production of 
new technical knowledge and its transmission and application of such knowledge are viewed as 
by-products in the production and adoption of new capital goods (Shell, 1966 and Taylor, 2007). 
For economies to experience technical progress and development,  it is critical according to 
Shell  to  channel  resources  into  inventive  activity  as  it  propels  new  technology,  minimises 
knowledge decay and leads to greater innovation. The model describes the rate of change of 
technological progress to equal θ denoting the success of research coefficient with σ denoting 
the  fraction  output  derived  from  inventive  purposes  (Shell,  1966).  This  is  demonstrated  in 
equation 4.4. 
 
(4.4) 
As  capital  depreciates,  Shell  incorporated  into  the  model     which  represents  technical 
knowledge decay (Shell, 1966). 
 
 
(4.5) 
A’t = ϴσt Yt – β At 
A’t = ϴσ - β At 
where ϴσ – β > 0 44  
 
Equation 4.5 suggests that if the research coefficient and the fraction of output derived from 
inventive purposes after accounting for technical knowledge decay remains greater than zero, 
then there is an unlimited constraint to the potential growth in knowledge (Taylor, 2007 and 
Sato, 1966). 
Since the Neoclassical Growth Model and the Capital Controversy which followed, there have 
been numerous attempts to address the issue of assigning factor prices to capital. The works of 
Kaldor, Salter Arrow and Shell have updated the economic growth literature. The conclusion 
seems to derive from comments by Robinson (1980) where she originally described that time 
periods were a critical aspect of capital since capital is both dynamic and continuously changing 
based upon new ideas, innovation, and techniques (Robinson, 1980 and Harcourt, 1972 and 
1976). Despite the shortcomings of the Neoclassical Growth Model it does however attempt to 
quantify the proportion of economic growth attributed via methods of factor accumulation and 
also by the degree of growth attributable from technical progress (Solow, 1956; Swan 1956 and 
Denison,  1962).  The  overall  appeal  of  the  Neoclassical  Growth  Model  was  its  ability  to 
graphically  describe  TFP  thus  giving  rise  to  policy  implications  relating  to  the  theory  of 
convergence hypothesis. This will be discussed in the next section. 45  
 
4.7:  Convergence Hypothesis 
 
Convergence hypothesis states that if countries exhibit similar production technologies, savings 
and population growth rates then in the long run they will converge to a comparable level of 
per capita income at the steady state equilibrium (Sala-i-Martin, 1996). Convergence hypothesis 
described that poor countries can converge in the long run starting with a low capital-labour 
ratio.  Convergence  is  when  Sf(k)  exceeds  (n+g+δ)k  and  thus  the  capital  to  labour  ratio  is 
increasing (Barro, Sala-i-Martin, Blanchard and Hall, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; 1995 
and Barro, 1991). Whilst this is occurring, shifts along the Sf(k) curve increases at a decreasing 
rate  and  in  doing  so  both  the  income  per  capita  and  capital  per  capita  increases.  This  is 
summarised in equation 4.6. 
 
(4.6) 
Equation 4.6 implies that capital per capita increases when Sf(k) exceeds (n+g+δ)k and the point 
of convergence occurs when Sf(k) equals (n+g+δ)k (Sala-i-Martin, 1996 and Taylor, 2007). Since 
poor countries have access to best methods of production and spill-over’s of retired vintages of 
capital described by Kaldor (1960) and Salter (1966) this accelerates economic growth (Kaldor, 
1960 and Salter, 1966). These economies have low capital per labour ratio and over time they 
will convergence with rich countries. By taking the derivative of yk with respect to k equation 
4.6 is transformed into equation 4.7. This function implies that countries with limited amounts 
of capital per capita represented by k are associated with larger values of yk and therefore tend 
yk’ = k’t = sf (kt) – (δ+n+g) kt 46  
 
to display a faster rate of economic growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995 and Abramovitz, 
1986). 
 
(4.7)
 
It was described by Gerschenkron (1962) that poor and undeveloped countries could use their 
relative backwardness  to  their  own  advantage to  accelerate  economic  progression  through 
time (Gerschenkron, 1962; Ruffin, 1979; Samuelson, 1948 and Powel, 2008). It is assumed that 
developing  countries  have  access  to  advanced  vintages  of  technology  generated  by  the 
wealthier developed countries. Since the level of capital per capita is small economic growth in 
developing countries tends to be fast and the incumbent capital provides a productivity boost 
(Gerschenkron, 1962). 
Advancement in the field of convergence has lead Sala-i-Martin to describe there being two 
main  types  of  convergence  which  can  occur.  Absolute  or  β-convergence  describes  poor 
countries  tendencies  for  fast  paced  economic  growth  (Barro  et  al,  1991;  Barro  and  Sala-i-
Martin, 1992 and Baumol, 1986). θ-Convergence describes groups of economies converging in 
terms of their dispersion of real GDP per capita decreasing over time. This form of convergence 
describes countries forming clusters of similar national wealth due to similar values of s, n, g 
and δ with similar production functions (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). The only variation in 
convergence here is the initial starting point of capital per capita with poorer countries having a 
smaller k and y and therefore experiencing faster growth. The dynamics of k is determined 
through the Sf(k) and (n+g+δ)k curves described in figure 3.4 (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995 and 
δyk/δk = sf (f’(k)) – (f (k/k))/(k) < 0 47  
 
Sala-i-Martin, 1996). The growth in k will be larger for the economy with the smaller initial k 
value and by the amount the Sf(k) curve exceeds (n+g+δ)k (Sala-i-Martin, 1996). 
Sala-i-Martin added empirical evidence towards the theory of convergence. He tested both 
concepts of β-convergence and θ-convergence, across a range of countries and states (Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). The findings revealed that both types of convergence existed among a 
sub-sample of OECD countries, across the individual states of America and sections of Japan. 
The speed of convergence was similar across all the data sets tested at 2% convergence each 
year.  Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin found  evidence to  suggest that poorer regions of the  United 
States of America grew at a faster rate than the wealthier regions (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
1995). This relationship is demonstrated in figure 4.4 below. 
Figure 4.4:  Evidence of Convergence within the United States of America
5 
Source: Sala-i-Martin, Barro, Blanchard and Hall (1991, p.114) 
                                                      
5 (AL) Alabama;  (AR) Arkansas; (AZ) Arizona; (CA) California; (CO) Colorado; (CT) Connecticut; (DE) Delaware;  (FL) Florida; (GA) Georgia; (ID) 
Idaho; (IA);  (IL) Illinois; (IN) Indiana; (IA) Iowa; (KS) Kansas; (KY) Kentucky; (LA) Louisiana; (ME) Maine; (MD) Maryland; (MA) Massachusetts; 
(MI) Michigan; (MN) Minnesota; (MS) Mississippi; (MO) Missouri; (MT) Montana; (NE) Nebraska; (NV) Nevada; (NH) New Hampshire; (NJ) New 
Jersey; (NM) New Mexico; (NY) New York; (NC) North Carolina; (ND) North Dakota; (OH) Ohio; (OR) Oregon; (PA) Pennsylvania; (RI) Rhode 
Island; (SC) South Carolina; (SD) South Dakota; (TN) Tennessee; (TX) Texas; (UT) Utah;  (VT) Vermont; (VA) Virginia; (WA) Washington; (WA) 
West Virginia; (WI) Wisconsin; and (WY) Wyoming.   48  
 
Figure 4.4 reveals the broad pattern of β-convergence in per capita income for the 47 U.S states 
within the region of 1880 to 1988. There exists a strong negative correlation of -0.93 between 
the  average  growth  rates  and  the  log  per  capita  of  personal  income  (Sala-i-Martin,  Barro, 
Blanchard  and  Hall,  1991).  A  key  observations  noted  by  Gerschenkron  (1962)  is  that  poor 
southern states seemed to be clustered at the top of the chart such as Florida, North Carolina 
and South Carolina (Sala-i-Martin, Barro, Blanchard and Hall, 1991). These states from 1880 had 
the lowest per capita income and also the highest average growth rates thereafter. Conversely 
the wealthier states had above average per capita income of which after 1880 began to grow at 
below average pace (Sala-i-Martin, Barro, Blanchard and Hall, 1991). This demonstrates a sort 
of regional catch-up where the rate of convergence was only 2% per year. 
Sala-i-Martin (1996) found that convergence did not always hold true as revealed in figure 4.4 
with a near perfect negative relationship demonstrating β-convergence. When measuring poor 
and  wealthy  countries  there  seemed  to  be  no  cross-country  evidence  to  suggest  any  β-
convergence and in some instances Sala-i-Martin achieved absolutely no correlation. He found 
that θ-divergence was actually increasing (Sala-i-Martin, 1996). This suggested that there is 
actually growing inequality between the rich and poor.  Quah (1996b) introduced the Twin-
Peaks Hypothesis to describe θ-divergence. This concept described the divergence of income 
distribution into two distinct groups over time, being the wealthy and poor countries (Quah, 
1996a and 1996b). This concept is demonstrated in figure 4.5 below. 49  
 
Figure 4.5:  ϴ-Divergence and the Twin Peaks Hypothesis 
 
Source: Quah (1996b p.18) 
 
At time t the majority of the different countries incomes are all grouped in the one area in the 
middle of the graph. However at t+s, two separate peaks have emerged with the peak on the 
top representing the wealthier group and the peak on the bottom representing the poor (Quah, 
1996b). θ-Divergence can be explained through spill-over effects discussed by Arrow (1962). 
The  wealthier  countries  have  access  to  the  newest  technology  and  productive  machinery 
leading to a branching out of technical progress which causes disparities amongst the groups 
(Quah, 1996a; 1996b; Powel, 2008 and United Nations, 1997). As income distributions tend to 
flow  towards  the  wealthier  countries  divergence  occurs  creating  two  separate  and  distinct 
peaks. This leads to two distinct groups for which the wealthier group will continue to innovate 50  
 
and thus exhibit continuous long lasting economic growth. This is summarised by Quah (1993, 
p. 39): 
The picture that emerges is one of a world where countries tend-in the long–run towards 
either the very rich or very poor, with the middle income classes disappearing. The disparity 
between the rich and poor, further, appears to be widening. 
 
4.8:  Conclusion 
 
This  chapter  has  provided  a  brief  overview  of the  literature that  arose  in  response  to the 
Neoclassical Growth Model. Much of the literature originated from the Keynesians School of 
Thought  in  relation  to  the  Cambridge  Controversy  and  the  aggregation  of  factor  prices 
described by Solow (1956). This debate features arguments put forward by Robinson (1971 and 
1980) and also a summary of the debate by Harcourt (1972 and 1976). Chapter 4 has also 
discussed  various  alternative  models  by  Kaldor,  Salter,  Arrow  and  Shell  in  the  attempt  to 
address the shortcomings of the Neoclassical Growth Model. This chapter concluded by briefly 
exploring the concept of absolute β-convergence, σ-convergence and the empirical evidence 
supporting divergence in per capita income between wealthy and poor countries. This chapter 
discussed the literature of convergence originating from Sala-i-Martin (1996), Barro (1991) and 
Quah (1993; 1996a and 1996b). This chapter has also provided a theoretical framework for the 
central aim of the thesis which is to estimate TFP growth of 21 OECD economies. The empirical 
findings are presented in Chapter 5. 51  
 
CHAPTER 5: TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY ESTIMATIONS  
   
5.1:  Introduction 
 
As discussed in chapter 3, the Neoclassical Growth Model attempted to describe the economic 
growth derived from the accumulation of factors being capital, labour and the rate of growth in 
TFP (Solow, 1956 and Swan, 1956). Solow (1956) proved that capital was not able to produce 
long  term  economic  growth  due  to  its  diminishing  marginal  productivity  (Solow,  1956  and 
Swan, 1956). Solow (1956 and 1957) demonstrated that TFP growth is essential for long term 
economic  growth.  Young  (1994)  is  one  of  few  economists  to  compute  the  TFP  growth  of 
numerous countries around the world. The central aim of the thesis is to attempt to update the 
empirical findings of Young (1994) by replicating the methodology described by Solow (1956 
and 1957).This chapter will present estimates of total factor productivity on a sample of 21 
OECD  economies.  In  order  to  achieve  this  aim,  this  chapter  is  organised  into  several 
subchapters: 
5.2  A review of Young (1994)-Lessons from the East Asian NICS: Contrarian View; 
5.3 Estimating Trends in Australia’s Productivity: The Commonwealth Treasury; 
5.4 Methodology for calculating TFP; and 
5.5 Empirical results 52  
 
5.2:  A Review of Young (1994)-Lessons from the East Asian NICS: A Contrarian 
View 
 
Solow (1956) illustrated in Figure 3.4 the dynamics of the Neoclassical Growth Model. When 
the Sf(k) curve is equal to the (n+g+δ)k curve the economy is at the steady state equilibrium. 
Growth occurs when the Sf(k) curve exceeds the (n+g+δ)k curve (Solow, 1956 and Swan, 1956). 
Therefore when the Sf(k) curve is less than the (n+g+δ)k curve there is negative growth and 
diminishing marginal returns sets in. This results in a reduction in output per capita and capital 
per capita (Solow, 1956 and Swan, 1956). This was the case for the post-war growth of the 
Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) which included Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and 
Taiwan  (Young,  1992;  1994;  Nelson,  1996  and  Nelson  and  Pack,  1999).  The  rapid  growth 
demonstrated by these economies suggested that there are dynamic gains from an open and 
outward  orientated  economy.  However  Young  maintains  that  the  conclusion  of  dynamic 
economic growth is false and the NICs represent merely a strong outward orientation with 
extraordinary rates of pure factor accumulation fuelling its economic growth. Young stated that 
once factor accumulation has been accounted for the residual being TFP from the production 
function seems to be very small (Young, 1992; 1994 and Krugman, 1994). In Young’s analysis he 
uses the Summers and Heston purchasing power of parity data set to compile table 5.1 below 
(Summers and Heston, 1991). 53  
 
Table 5.1:  Annual Growth of Output per Capita from 1960-1985 
             
(1)Botswana 
0.0067 
(2)Taiwan 
0.062 
(3)H.Kong  
0.059 
(4)Singapore 
0.059 
(5)S.Korea     
0.057 
(6)Japan  
0.055 
(7)Malta   
0.053 
(8)Lesotho 
0.051 
(9)Egypt    
0.050 
(10)Cyprus 
0.049 
(11)Gabon 
0.045 
(12)Greece 
0.044 
(13)Brazil 
0.042 
(14)Syria   
0.041 
(15)Portugal 
0.041 
(16)Malaysia 
0.039 
(17)Yugoslavia 
0.039 
(18)China     
0.038 
(19)Thailand 
0.038 
(20)Norway 
0.036 
(21)Cameroon 
0.036 
(22)Congo  
0.035 
(23)Italy    
0.035 
(24) Panama 
0.035 
(25)Spain      
0.035 
(26)Finland 
0.035 
(27)Morocco 
0.034 
(28)Israel 
0.034 
(29)Austria 
0.033 
(30)Tunisia  
0.032 
(31)Iceland 
0.032 
(32)France  
0.030 
(33)Jordon 
0.029 
(34)Denmark 
0.028 
(35)Belgium 
0.028 
(36)Netherlands 
0.027 
(37)Paraguay 
0.027 
(38)Canada 
0.026 
(39)Burma 
0.026 
(40)W.Germany   
0.026 
(41)Turkey 
0.026 
(42)Algeria 
0.026 
(43)Sweden 
0.026 
(44)Ecuador   
0.026 
(45)Ireland 
0.025 
(46)Mexico 
0.025 
(47)Suriname 
0.024 
(48)Iran   
0.023 
(49)Swaziland 
0.023 
(50)Barbados  
0.023 
(51)Mauritius 
0.023 
(52)Luxembourg 
0.023 
(53)Pakistan 
0.023 
(54)Tanzania 
0.023 
(55)Gambia 
0.023 
(56)Colombia 
0.023 
(57)Australia 
0.022 
(58)Dom. Rep. 
0.022 
(59)U.S.A   
0.021 
(60)U.K     
0.021 
(61)Costa Rica      
0.021 
(62)Togo 
0.019 
(63)Cape 
Verde 0.019 
(64)Trin. & Tob. 
0.018 
(65)Switzerland 
0.017 
         
Source: Young (1994 p.961) 
According to the findings in table 5.1, the NICs including Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and 
South Korea demonstrated the fastest annual growth in output per capita. These NICs occupy 
the top five fastest growing economies in the post war eras (Young, 1992; 1994 and Krugman, 54  
 
1994).  Young  (1994)  proposed  that  instead  of  using  growth  of  output  per  capita  which  is 
attained through factor accumulation, a more accurate measure would be through output per 
work. The reason for this is output per worker is an accurate indication of productivity. Young 
replicated the calculations in table 5.1 in relation to output per worker (Young, 1994). The 
results  appeared  to  vary  dramatically.  Many  of  the  NICs  observed  a  1%  reduction  when 
calculating output per worker. 18 non-NICs are within one standard deviation away from the 
same output per worker as Taiwan (Young, 1994). Young’s findings are illustrated in table 5.2. 
Table 5.2:  Annual Growth of Output per Worker from 1960-1985 
             
(1) Botswana 
0.0076 
(2)Gabon   
0.069 
(3)Lesotho 
0.057 
(4)Taiwan    
0.055 
(5)Japan     
0.054 
(6)Egypt      
0.053 
(7)S.Korea   
0.050 
(8)H.Kong 
0.047 
(9)Greece  
0.047 
(10)Syria   
0.046 
(11)Cameroon 
0.045 
(12)Congo  
0.043 
(13)Cyprus 
0.043 
(14)Singapore 
0.043 
(15)Malta  
0.040 
(16)Yugoslavia 
0.039 
(17)Spain  
0.037 
 
(18)Thailand     
0.037 
(19)Italy     
0.037 
(20)Brazil   
0.037 
(21)Austria 
0.035 
(22)Swaziland 
0.014 
(23)Portugal 
0.035 
(24) Malaysia 
0.034 
(25) Jordon      
0.034 
(26)Turkey 
0.033 
(27)Panama 
0.033 
(28)Gambia 
0.033 
  (29)Algeria 
0.033 
(30)China  
0.012 
(31)Israel     
0.032 
(32)Morocco  
0.031 
(33)Finland 
0.031 
(34)France 
0.029 
(35)Tunisia 
0.028 
(36)Ecuador 
0.027 
(43)Paraguay 
0.025 
(37)Norway 
0.027 
(44)W.Germany 
0.025 
(38)Tanzania 
0.027 
(45) Belgium 
0.025 
(39)Burma 
0.027 
(40)Pakistan   
0.027 
(41)Ivory Coast 
0.026 
(42)Ireland 
0.026 
 Source: Young (1994 p.964) 
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The large variation in economic performance from table 5.1 and 5.2 suggested a tremendous 
growth in participation rates in the post war era and significant increase in female participation 
rates. For example in Hong Kong the aggregate participation rate grew from 39% in 1960 to 
53%  in  1985  (Young,  1994).  The  rising  participation  rates  alone  are  associated  with  faster 
economic growth whereby 1% increases in participation leads to approximately 0.85% increase 
in the growth of output per capita (Young, 1994 and World Bank, 1993). Since the NICs have 
some of the largest participation rate increases this left the NICs susceptible to the largest of 
reduction in growth if the measurement shifts from output per capita to the more appropriate 
output per worker statistic. 
Young extended the data set put forth by Summers and Heston using a period from 1970-1985. 
Within such time frame Young computed a list of 66 economies illustrating the annual growth 
rate of total factor productivity in table 5.3 (Young, 1994). 56  
 
Table 5.3:  Annual Growth of Total Factor Productivity from 1970-1985 
             
(1) Egypt 
0.0035 
(2)Pakistan 
0.030 
(3)Botswana 
0.029 
(4)Congo    
0.028 
(5)Malta     
0.026 
(6)H.Kong 
0.025 
(7)Syria   
0.025 
(8)Zimbabwe 
0.024 
(9)Gabon  
0.024 
(10)Tunisia 
0.024 
(11)Cameroon 
0.024 
(12)Lesotho 
0.022 
(13)Uganda 
0.021 
(14)Cyprus 
0.021 
(15)Thailand 
0.019 
(16)Bangladesh 
0.019 
(17)Iceland 
0.018 
 
(18)Italy     
0.018 
(19)Norway 
0.017 
(20)Finland 
0.015 
(21)Taiwan 
0.015 
(22)Ecuador 
0.014 
(23)Guinea 
0.014 
(24) S.Korea 
0.014 
(25)Iran      
0.014 
(26)Burma 
0.014 
(27)Mauritius 
0.013 
(28)China 
0.013 
  (29)Denmark 
0.013 
(30)Israel  
0.012 
(31)Greece 
0.012 
(32)Japan  
0.012 
(33)Luxembourg 
0.012 
(34)Yugoslavia 
0.011 
(35)Tanzania 
0.011 
(36)Colombia 
0.011 
(37)Sweden 
0.010 
(38)Malaysia 
0.010 
(39)Malawi 
0.010 
(40)Brazil   
0.010 
(41)Panama 
0.009 
(42)U.K  
0.009 
(43)W.Germany 
0.009 
(44)Mali   
0.008 
(45)Turkey 
0.008 
(46)Netherlands 
0.008 
(47)Ethiopia 
0.007 
(48)Austria 
0.007 
(49)Australia 
0.007 
(50)Spain  
0.006 
(51)Kenya 
0.006 
(52)France 
0.005 
(53)Liberia 
0.004 
(54)Paraguay 
0.004 
(55)Honduras 
0.004 
(56)Portugal 
0.004 
(57)U.S.A  
0.004 
(58)Belgium 
0.004 
(59)Canada 
0.003 
(60)Algeria 
0.003 
(61)CAR      
0.002 
(62)India 
0.001 
(63)Singapore 
0.001 
(64)Sri Lanka 
0.001 
(65)Fiji      
0.001 
(66)Switzerland 
0.000 
       
 Source: Young (1994 p.970) 
Some of the key observations here is that although Hong Kong remains the top performing NIC 
with the highest annual growth of TFP, the spread of the remaining NICs are wide with Taiwan 
and South Korea in 21
st and 24
th position respectively and Singapore in 63
rd position. This is 
significantly different to the cluster of NICs in table 5.1. Kim and Lau (1994) concluded that 
there was virtually no TFP growth when considering the growth accounting for Singapore (Kim 
and  Lau,  1994; Young, 1994  and 1995).  Almost  all  of  the  economic  growth  attributable  to 57  
 
Singapore from 1966-1980 seems to be only explainable by increases in factor inputs. In the 
1950s  a  similar  trend  emerged  with  the  Soviet  Union  achieving  rapid  economic  growth 
described by Krugman as an astonishing demonstration of capital mobilisation. Krugman (1994, 
p.40) stated: 
Asian growth, like that of the Soviet Union in its high-growth era, seems to be driven by 
extraordinary growth in inputs like labour and capital rather than by gains in efficiency. 
 
In Kim and Lau’s empirical findings their conclusions regarding Singapore’s economic growth 
confirmed Krugman’s view and thus Singapore’s economic growth via factor accumulation was 
achieved through massive mobilisation of capital (Kim and Lau, 1994 and Krugman, 1994). Kim 
and Lau also offered their own reason as to why productivity growth appeared non-existent. 
Firstly  there  is  a  lack  of  investment  in  research  and  development  and  therefore  domestic 
technological improvements are scarce. The accumulation of capital per capita means that the 
capital deepening process is not knowledge or technologically intensive (Kim and Lau, 1994 and 
Krugman, 1994). This means that new inventions or innovations are not driving the economic 
growth and thus justifying the unimpressive annual TFP growth figures. In addition the capital 
goods used in high technology industries generally embody technical progress and the NICs are 
limited in their ability to utilise these industries to obtain technical progress. Young described 
that outward orientated NICs when considering annual TFP growth have demonstrated a far 
less than miraculous productivity growth (Krugman, 1994 and Kim and Lau, 1994). According to 
Young it would be erroneous to conclude that the NICs are a prime example of dynamic gains 
achieved from outward orientated policies (Nelson and Pack, 1999 and Krugman, 1994). The 58  
 
remaining portion of this chapter will focus on updating table 5.3 and thereby attempting to 
update the empirical findings of Young (1994). 
 
5.3:  Estimating Trends in Australia’s Productivity: The Commonwealth 
Treasury 
 
The  Commonwealth  Treasury  produced  a  paper  titled,  Estimating  Trends  in  Australia’s 
Productivity which estimated a simple aggregate production function for the economy using a 
Cobb-Douglas  format  as  represented  in  equation  3.11  (The  Treasury,  2003;  2009;  Quiggin, 
2001; Gruen, 2001 and 2011). The paper used quarterly ABS data to decompose the TFP growth 
in Australia. Using data from Sep 1978-2000 and assuming α=0.31 the publication separated 
between TFP growth and labour productivity growth. 
Table 5.4:  Australian TFP Estimates from 1978-2000 
  Contribution of Capital 
α=0.31 
TFP Growth  Labour Productivity 
Growth 
Sep 1978-Dec 1981  0.60 
0.60 
0.80 
1.0 
0.2 
1.5 
1.60 
0.8 
2.2 
Dec 1981-Jun1990 
Jun 1990-Sep 2000 
Source: The Treasury (2009 p.20) 
The paper concluded from their estimates by noting a large spike in TFP growth during the 
1990s (Parham, 2005; Rahman, 2005 and Gruen, 2011). An alpha of 0.31 was assigned to capital 
based on the literature of Sala-i-Martin (1995) and observations that approximately one third of 59  
 
national  income  accrue  to  capital.  The  empirical  estimate  in  table  5.4  adopts  the  same 
methodology as Solow (1957). The following subchapter will outline the methodology for the 
estimation of TFP based on the documented best practice established by Solow (1957) and 
reinforced by The Commonwealth Treasury. 
 
5.4:  Methodology for calculating TFP 
The  Neoclassical  Growth  Model  has  been  explored  in  depth  in  chapter  3;  however  it  is 
important to reintroduce the production function so that the methodology used in this analysis 
is consistent with Solow (1957). Firstly equation 3.11 describes output as a function of capital, 
labour and technological progress. 
 
(3.11) 
The Neoclassical Growth Model can be expressed in terms of the percentage change in TFP in a 
Cobb-Douglas format shown in equation 3.12. It is this equation which will estimate the TFP 
growth. 
 
 (3.12) 
Y= A (K
α, L
β)  where α+β =1 
â =ý-ḱ 
α ĺ 
β 
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5.4.1:  Data limitation and scope 
 
The data used to estimate the TFP growth is from the OECD Factbook 2006 (OECD, 2005; 2006a 
and 2006b). The OECD was established in 1961 and in 2006 there were officially 30 members. 
The rationale for sourcing data from the OECD was due to the quality data relating to a variety 
of  time  series.  In  previous  drafts,  other  sources  were  used  including  the  PennWorld  Data 
Version 6.3 and the World Bank Indicators 2003. However in the effort to remain homogenous 
all inputs were available in the desirable format from the OECD Factbook (OECD, 2006a and 
2006b). 
The thesis focuses on 21 highly developed OECD economies noted for their strong GDP per 
capita ranging from $US 12,896 to $US 32,213. Table 5.5 outlines the economies that will be 
analysed
6 (OECD, 2006b).  
Table 5.5:  A List of the 21 OECD Economies to be analysed 
OECD Members as of 2006 
Australia  United 
States of 
America 
United 
Kingdom 
Austria  Canada  Czech 
Republic 
Denmark 
Finland  France  Germany  Greece  Ireland  Italy  Japan 
Luxembourg  Netherlands  Norway  Portugal  Spain  Sweden  Switzerland 
             
 
                                                      
6 The list of 21 OECD countries being analysed. 61  
 
The  following  discussion  documents  the  explanatory  variables  used  to  derive  updated 
estimates of TFP growth. 
5.4.2:  Explanatory Variables 
Output (ý) 
 
The Real Net National Product (RNNP) serves as the most accurate indicator for the value of 
finished goods and serves produced by a country after depreciation (Solow, 1956 and Swan, 
1956). Due to the scarcity of such data Solow used the non-farm Gross National Product as the 
closest proxy for output and thus reducing this figure by the percentage of unemployment to 
represent idle capacity. In this empirical analysis output is explainable by using real annual GDP 
growth  rate.  The  reason  for  using  this  proxy  was  due  to  its  broad  based  and  highly  well 
regarded ability to measure economic growth which translates to output in equation 3.12. Real 
GDP figures for all of the OECD economies in this thesis where readily available. By setting the 
year 1995 as the generic base year and working from data ranging from 1995 to 2004 it is 
possible to compute the percentage change in real GDP by following the standard percentage 
change function demonstrated in equation 5.1 (OECD, 2006b)
7. 
 
 
(5.1) 
                                                      
7 Percentage change formula. 
%∆ = (X1 – X-1)/(X-1) 
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Labour (ĺ) 
 
The  Neoclassical  Growth  Model  assumes  that  the  labour  force  grows  at  a  constant  rate 
governed by equation 3.2 reiterated below (Solow, 1956 and Swan, 1956). 
 
(3.2) 
The growth in the supply of labour can be estimated by measuring the annual growth in the 
employment rate. To derive the estimated change in the employment rate, the annualised 
official unemployment rate as a percentage of the labour force is subtracted by 100 to give the 
estimated employment rate (OECD, 2006b). The data is then converted into the percentage 
change in the employment rate through equation 5.1. 
 
Capital (ḱ) 
 
The ideal measure of capital in an economy is the annual flow of capital services as it accurately 
identifies the direct real impact capital has on the economy. Due to data limitations the, Net 
Fixed Capital Formation–Machinery and Equipment statistic is used to estimate capital (OECD, 
2006b).  This  is  derived from  the  Gross  Fixed  Capital-Machinery  and  Equipment  (Maddison, 
2007). This is defined as the acquisition less disposal, of fixed capital assets. These include 
assets which are expected to be used in production for several years of which are subsequently 
disposed of at the assets scrap value. Fixed assets are defined as machinery and equipment, 
L(t) = L0 (1+n)
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dwellings  and  other  buildings,  roads  bridges  and  railways  which  have  future  productive 
capacities (OECD, 2006b). The OECD however publishes this series without adjusting for the CPI. 
By  adjusting  the  Gross  Fixed  Capital  Formation-Machinery  and  Equipment  for  CPI  and 
expressing this in terms of a percentage change, this derives Net Fixed Capital-Machinery and 
Equipments and forms the proxy used to estimate capital (OECD, 2006b). 
Capital and labour share of output (α+β=1) 
 
The final explanatory variable is α and β which introduces weights for both capital and labour 
shares. According to the Cobb-Douglas function α+β=1 and by altering capital and labour shares 
this changes the TFP projections Referring back to Solow (1956) capital undergoes depreciation 
and therefore large alpha variables indicate a capital intensive economy with limited long run 
potential  for  economic  growth.  Conversely  large  beta  variables  indicate  a  labour  intensive 
economy (Solow, 1956 and Swan, 1956). Table 5.6 establishes boundaries which determine the 
degree of capital intensity and the corresponding level of economic development. Developed 
OECD  economies  such  as  Australia  and  The  United  States  would  be  classified  as  highly 
developed and therefore an alpha variable between 0.2 and 0.35 would be appropriate when 
estimating TFP growth
8. 
                                                      
8 The World Bank α boundaries for highly developed and developing economies. World Bank. 2000. Measuring Growth in Total Factor 
Productivity. Washington D.C: World Bank Publishing. 
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Table 5.6:  Alpha Boundaries  
Development Stage  Boundaries 
Highly 
Developed 
  0.2  to  0.35     
Developing    0.36  to  0.50     
Source: World Bank (2000, p.42) 65  
 
5.4.3:  Summary of Explanatory Variables 
 
The explanatory variables outlined above is summarised below into a concise schedule. The 
explanatory  variables  and  the  required  data  came  from  careful  analysis  of  the  economic 
literature by Solow (1956 and 1957), Robinson (1971), Young(1992 and 1994) and the estimates 
by the Commonwealth Treasury (Solow, 1956; 1957; Robinson, 1971; Young, 1992; 1994 and 
The Treasury, 2009). The explanatory variables are as follows: 
    â refers to the percentage change in TFP. 
    ý refers to the estimated real annual GDP growth rate expressed as a percentage 
change from the x-1 time period (Base year=1995). 
    ḱ refers to the estimated Net Fixed Capital Formation-Machinery and Equipment 
expressed as a percentage change from the x-1 time period. (Base year=1995). 
    ĺ  refers  to  the  estimated  annual  growth  in  the  employment  rate  (Base 
year=1995). 
α refers to the share of capital. 
    β refers to the share of labour. 66  
 
5.4.4:  Documented Procedure 
 
Determining the Ideal Data Set 
 
The first step to estimate the percentage change in TFP was to select the most accurate data 
set for the empirical analysis. The thesis experimented with the PennWorld Data and the World 
Bank Indicators 2003 in earlier drafts which yielded undesirable results in capital and output. 
Firstly the World Bank Indicators 2003 expressed output in terms of the local currency and 
therefore the comparability of output proved difficult and exchange rates became an additional 
complication. A similar situation arose when measuring capital with both data sets offering a 
less than ideal measure for capital. Capital was expressed in terms of expenditure which also 
raised the issue of adjusting for currencies. Secondly on both data sets depreciation had to be 
accounted for manually assuming idle capacity equals the level of unemployment and thus 
applying  the  unemployment  rate  to  the  deprecation  rate  of  capital.  Solow  (1957,  p.314) 
described this assumption as being: 
...undoubtedly wrong but probably gets closer to the truth than making no correction at all. 
The necessary data for the explanatory variables outlined in 5.44 were easily obtainable from 
the OECD Factbook 2006 (OECD, 2006). With the interest of remaining homogenous it was the 
ideal option to obtain data from the same primary source. 67  
 
Construction of Table 
 
To estimate the percentage change in TFP it was necessary to construct a table for each of the 
21 countries. The table was organised into 12 columns and 12 rows. Each of the columns was 
individually titled and raw data was inserted and refined to derive each of the explanatory 
variables outlined in 5.44. The 12 rows represented the data for each of the years from 1995-
2004 including a 9 year average. 
Deriving the Explanatory Variables 
 
The column used in the table reflects a similar methodology used by Solow (1957). In the thesis, 
Real GDP Growth Rate (column C) is subtracted from the previous year’s value to derive the 
percentage change in Real GDP (column D, where the base year=1995). Column D represents 
the estimated real annual GDP growth rate expressed as a percentage change from the x-1 time 
period (OECD, 2006b). The explanatory variable for capital is derived by multiplying Gross Fixed 
Capital Formation Machinery and Equipment (column E) with CPI (column F and G). This derives 
the  estimated  Net  Fixed  Capital  Formation  Machinery  and  Equipment  expressed  as  a 
percentage change from the x-1 time period (column H) (OECD, 2006b). The percentage change 
in Net Fixed Capital Formation Machinery and Equipment is expressed in column I.  
The estimated percentage change in the rate of employment is derived by subtracting 100% 
from the unemployment rate in column J to give the employment rate as a percentage of 
labour force (column K). The percentage change in the employment rate therefore gives the 
estimated  percentage  change  in  the  rate  of  employment  (column  L)  (OECD,  2004).  After 68  
 
deriving the appropriate explanatory variables form the OECD Factbook, a variety of α and β 
values are applied as per table 5.6 within the highly developed definition. Table 5.7 summarises 
the steps taken to derive the explanatory variables. 
Table 5.7:  Deriving the Explanatory Variables  
Explanatory 
Variable 
Method to derive Explanatory Variables 
â  =ý-ḱ 
α ĺ 
β 
Real GDP Annual Growth Rate(x)-Real GDP Annual Growth Rate(x-1) 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation Machinery and Equipment (x) *(CPI/100)- Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation Machinery and Equipment (x-1) *(CPI/100) 
ý 
ḱ 
ĺ  100%-Unemployment Rate(x)- 100%-Unemployment Rate(x-1) 
α  Assumed value from 0.20-0.35 
β  Assumed Value from 0.80-0.65 
 
The empirical results for the estimation of TFP growth assumes α=0.20, 0.25, 0.30 and 0.35 
from 1996-2004 where 1995 is assigned the base year (World Bank, 2000). The empirical results 
are grouped into two clusters. The first cluster consists of Australia, the United States, Canada 
and Japan The second cluster consists of all the remaining Eurozone countries. 69  
 
5.5:  Empirical Results 
 
The estimation of TFP growth from 1996-2004 is detailed in the tables below. As discussed 
earlier, the thesis uses a variety of α values including 0.20, 0.25, 0.30 and 0.35. The empirical 
results are divided into two clusters for comparative purposes. The estimated TFP growth for 
each of the test α values reflects the growth exhibited for that particular year for the respective 
country.  In  addition  the  empirical  analysis  is  represented  graphically  outlining  the  average 
trends  of  the  estimated  TFP  growth.  According  to  the  economic  literature  from  Maddison 
(2007) economies in the past have developed faster based on their close proximity to other 
growing economies where international trade and foreign commerce occurs (Maddison, 2007; 
Smith, 1776; Krugman, 1979 and 1991b). After considering Maddison (2007) the results which 
follow are separated into two clusters: the OECD non-Eurozone countries (Cluster 1) and OECD 
Eurozone countries (Cluster 2). 70  
 
5.5.1:  Empirical Results for Cluster 1 
 
Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Australia 
Year  ý  ḱ  ĺ  â (α=0.20)  â (α=0.25)  â (α=0.30)  â (α=0.35) 
1996  -0.500  0.015  0.000  -0.503  -0.504  -0.505  -0.505 
1997  0.700  0.203  -0.100  0.739  0.724  0.709  0.694 
1998  0.800  -0.216  0.600  0.363  0.404  0.445  0.485 
1999  -1.500  0.209  0.800  -2.182  -2.152  -2.123  -2.093 
2000  -1.700  0.053  0.600  -2.191  -2.163  -2.136  -2.108 
2001  1.800  0.243  -0.500  2.151  2.114  2.077  2.040 
2002  -0.700  0.779  0.400  -1.176  -1.195  -1.214  -1.233 
2003  0.600  0.249  0.300  0.310  0.313  0.315  0.318 
2004  -0.800  0.216  0.600  -1.323  -1.304  -1.285  -1.266 
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Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for the United States of America 
Year  ý  ḱ  ĺ  â (α=0.20)  â (α=0.25)  â (α=0.30)  â (α=0.35) 
1996  1.200  0.333  0.200  0.973  0.967  0.960  0.953 
1997  0.800  0.094  0.500  0.381  0.402  0.422  0.442 
1998  -0.300  0.203  0.400  -0.661  -0.651  -0.641  -0.631 
1999  0.300  0.243  0.300  0.011  0.014  0.017  0.020 
2000  -0.800  0.244  0.200  -1.009  -1.011  -1.013  -1.015 
2001  -2.900  -0.615  -0.700  -2.217  -2.221  -2.225  -2.230 
2002  0.800  -0.724  -1.100  1.825  1.806  1.787  1.768 
2003  1.100  -0.080  -0.200  1.276  1.270  1.264  1.258 
2004  1.500  0.601  0.500  0.980  0.975  0.970  0.965 
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Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Canada 
Year  ý  ḱ  ĺ  â (α=0.20)  â (α=0.25)  â (α=0.30)  â (α=0.35) 
1996  -1.200  0.087  -0.100  -1.137  -1.147  -1.156  -1.165 
1997  2.600  1.229  0.500  1.954  1.918  1.881  1.845 
1998  -0.100  0.361  0.800  -0.812  -0.790  -0.768  -0.746 
1999  1.500  0.220  0.800  0.816  0.845  0.874  0.903 
2000  -0.300  -0.089  0.800  -0.922  -0.878  -0.833  -0.789 
2001  -3.500  -0.223  -0.400  -3.136  -3.144  -3.153  -3.162 
2002  1.300  -0.256  -0.500  1.751  1.739  1.727  1.715 
2003  -1.100  -0.129  0.100  -1.154  -1.143  -1.131  -1.120 
2004  0.900  0.018  0.400  0.576  0.595  0.615  0.634 
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Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Japan 
Year  ý  ḱ  ĺ  â (α=0.20)  â (α=0.25)  â (α=0.30)  â (α=0.35) 
1996  1.400  0.700  -0.300  1.500  1.450  1.400  1.350 
1997  -1.600  0.293  0.000  -1.659  -1.673  -1.688  -1.703 
1998  -2.800  -0.642  -0.700  -2.112  -2.114  -2.117  -2.120 
1999  0.900  -0.332  -0.600  1.446  1.433  1.420  1.406 
2000  2.500  0.031  0.000  2.494  2.492  2.491  2.489 
2001  -2.200  -0.268  -0.300  -1.906  -1.908  -1.910  -1.911 
2002  -0.500  -1.071  -0.400  0.034  0.068  0.101  0.135 
2003  1.600  -0.026  0.100  1.525  1.532  1.538  1.544 
2004  1.400  0.000  0.600  0.920  0.950  0.980  1.010 
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5.5.2:  Empirical Results for Cluster 2 
 
Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for the United Kingdom 
Year  ý  ḱ  ĺ  â (α=0.20)  â (α=0.25)  â (α=0.30)  â (α=0.35) 
1996  -0.200  0.433  0.600  -0.767  -0.758  -0.750  -0.742 
1997  0.500  -0.051  1.100  -0.370  -0.312  -0.255  -0.197 
1998  0.000  1.207  0.700  -0.801  -0.827  -0.852  -0.877 
1999  -0.200  -0.354  0.200  -0.289  -0.261  -0.234  -0.206 
2000  1.000  -0.068  0.500  0.614  0.642  0.670  0.699 
2001  -1.800  -0.365  0.400  -2.047  -2.009  -1.971  -1.932 
2002  -0.200  -0.494  -0.100  -0.021  -0.002  0.018  0.038 
2003  0.500  -0.645  0.200  0.469  0.511  0.554  0.596 
2004  0.700  -0.024  0.200  0.545  0.556  0.567  0.578 
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Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Austria 
Year  ý  ḱ  ĺ  â (α=0.20)  â (α=0.25)  â (α=0.30)  â (α=0.35) 
1996  0.700  0.231  -0.400  0.974  0.942  0.911  0.879 
1997  -0.800  0.298  -0.100  -0.780  -0.799  -0.819  -0.839 
1998  1.800  0.172  -0.100  1.846  1.832  1.818  1.805 
1999  -0.300  0.140  0.600  -0.808  -0.785  -0.762  -0.739 
2000  0.100  0.896  0.300  -0.319  -0.349  -0.379  -0.408 
2001  -2.600  0.146  0.000  -2.629  -2.636  -2.644  -2.651 
2002  0.200  -0.881  -0.600  0.856  0.870  0.884  0.898 
2003  0.400  0.537  -0.100  0.373  0.341  0.309  0.277 
2004  1.000  -0.029  -0.600  1.486  1.457  1.429  1.400 
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Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Czech Republic 
Year  ý  ḱ  ĺ  â (α=0.20)  â (α=0.25)  â (α=0.30)  â (α=0.35) 
1996  -1.700  1.840  0.200  -2.228  -2.310  -2.392  -2.474 
1997  -4.900  -0.064  -0.900  -4.167  -4.209  -4.251  -4.292 
1998  -0.400  0.626  -1.600  0.755  0.643  0.532  0.421 
1999  2.300  0.622  -2.200  3.936  3.794  3.653  3.512 
2000  2.700  1.890  -0.100  2.402  2.302  2.203  2.103 
2001  -1.300  0.253  0.700  -1.911  -1.888  -1.866  -1.844 
2002  -1.100  -0.135  0.700  -1.633  -1.591  -1.549  -1.508 
2003  1.700  -1.068  -0.500  2.314  2.342  2.370  2.399 
2004  1.500  0.312  -0.500  1.838  1.797  1.756  1.716 
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Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Denmark 
Year  ý  ḱ  ĺ  â (α=0.20)  â (α=0.25)  â (α=0.30)  â (α=0.35) 
1996  -0.300  -0.486  0.500  -0.603  -0.554  -0.504  -0.455 
1997  0.400  0.611  1.100  -0.602  -0.578  -0.553  -0.529 
1998  -1.000  4.588  0.300  -2.158  -2.372  -2.586  -2.801 
1999  0.400  0.689  0.100  0.182  0.153  0.123  0.094 
2000  0.900  1.761  0.400  0.228  0.160  0.092  0.024 
2001  -2.800  -0.066  0.100  -2.867  -2.858  -2.850  -2.842 
2002  -0.200  -0.086  -0.300  0.057  0.046  0.036  0.025 
2003  0.100  -0.773  -1.000  1.055  1.043  1.032  1.021 
2004  1.500  0.163  0.200  1.308  1.309  1.311  1.313 
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Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Finland 
Year  ý  ḱ  ĺ  â (α=0.20)  â (α=0.25)  â (α=0.30)  â (α=0.35) 
1996  0.400  0.412  0.800  -0.322  -0.303  -0.284  -0.264 
1997  2.400  0.452  1.900  0.790  0.862  0.934  1.007 
1998  -1.200  -0.099  1.400  -2.300  -2.225  -2.150  -2.075 
1999  -1.600  -0.409  1.100  -2.398  -2.323  -2.247  -2.172 
2000  1.600  -0.208  0.500  1.242  1.277  1.312  1.348 
2001  -4.000  0.669  0.600  -4.614  -4.617  -4.621  -4.624 
2002  1.200  -0.834  0.000  1.367  1.408  1.450  1.492 
2003  0.200  -0.475  0.100  0.215  0.244  0.273  0.301 
2004  1.200  0.221  0.000  1.156  1.145  1.134  1.123 
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Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for France 
Year  ý  ḱ  ĺ  â (α=0.20)  â (α=0.25)  â (α=0.30)  â (α=0.35) 
1996  -1.300  0.101  -0.500  -0.920  -0.950  -0.980  -1.010 
1997  1.300  -0.127  0.100  1.245  1.257  1.268  1.280 
1998  1.200  0.326  0.400  0.815  0.819  0.822  0.826 
1999  -0.300  0.422  0.600  -0.864  -0.855  -0.847  -0.838 
2000  0.800  0.304  1.400  -0.381  -0.326  -0.271  -0.216 
2001  -2.000  -0.001  0.700  -2.560  -2.525  -2.490  -2.455 
2002  -0.900  -0.498  -0.500  -0.400  -0.401  -0.401  -0.401 
2003  -0.400  -0.088  -0.600  0.098  0.072  0.047  0.021 
2004  1.500  0.119  -0.100  1.556  1.545  1.534  1.523 
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Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Germany 
Year  ý  ḱ  ĺ  â (α=0.20)  â (α=0.25)  â (α=0.30)  â (α=0.35) 
1996  -0.900  0.098  -0.500  -0.520  -0.550  -0.579  -0.609 
1997  0.800  0.320  -0.700  1.296  1.245  1.194  1.143 
1998  0.200  0.457  0.400  -0.211  -0.214  -0.217  -0.220 
1999  0.000  0.341  0.900  -0.788  -0.760  -0.732  -0.704 
2000  1.200  0.811  0.700  0.478  0.472  0.467  0.461 
2001  -2.000  -0.542  -0.200  -1.732  -1.715  -1.697  -1.680 
2002  -1.100  -0.717  -0.800  -0.317  -0.321  -0.325  -0.329 
2003  -0.300  -0.235  -0.900  0.467  0.434  0.401  0.367 
2004  1.800  0.009  -0.400  2.118  2.098  2.077  2.057 
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Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Greece 
Year  ý  ḱ  ĺ  â (α=0.20)  â (α=0.25)  â (α=0.30)  â (α=0.35) 
1996  0.300  1.146  -0.600  0.551  0.463  0.376  0.289 
1997  1.200  0.146  0.100  1.091  1.088  1.086  1.084 
1998  -0.200  1.040  -1.500  0.792  0.665  0.538  0.411 
1999  0.000  1.147  -0.900  0.491  0.388  0.286  0.184 
2000  1.100  0.960  0.700  0.348  0.335  0.322  0.309 
2001  0.100  0.206  0.500  -0.341  -0.327  -0.312  -0.297 
2002  -0.800  0.333  0.500  -1.267  -1.258  -1.250  -1.242 
2003  0.800  1.340  0.600  0.052  0.015  -0.022  -0.059 
2004  0.100  0.431  -0.800  0.654  0.592  0.531  0.469 
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Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Ireland 
Year  ý  ḱ  ĺ  â (α=0.20)  â (α=0.25)  â (α=0.30)  â (α=0.35) 
1996  -1.300  0.283  0.600  -1.837  -1.821  -1.805  -1.789 
1997  3.400  0.099  1.800  1.940  2.025  2.110  2.195 
1998  -3.200  0.902  2.400  -5.300  -5.225  -5.151  -5.076 
1999  2.200  0.497  1.800  0.661  0.726  0.791  0.856 
2000  -1.500  0.340  1.400  -2.688  -2.635  -2.582  -2.529 
2001  -3.000  -1.172  0.500  -3.166  -3.082  -2.998  -2.915 
2002  -0.100  -0.337  -0.500  0.367  0.359  0.351  0.343 
2003  -1.700  -0.330  -0.300  -1.394  -1.392  -1.391  -1.389 
2004  0.100  0.134  0.100  -0.007  -0.009  -0.010  -0.012 
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Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Italy 
Year  ý  ḱ  ĺ  â (α=0.20)  â (α=0.25)  â (α=0.30)  â (α=0.35) 
1996  -1.800  0.287  0.000  -1.857  -1.872  -1.886  -1.900 
1997  0.900  0.438  0.000  0.812  0.790  0.769  0.747 
1998  -0.200  0.441  -0.100  -0.208  -0.235  -0.262  -0.289 
1999  -0.100  0.531  0.300  -0.446  -0.458  -0.469  -0.481 
2000  1.300  0.730  0.900  0.434  0.442  0.451  0.459 
2001  -1.200  0.066  1.000  -2.013  -1.967  -1.920  -1.873 
2002  -1.400  -0.078  0.500  -1.784  -1.755  -1.726  -1.698 
2003  -0.100  -0.499  0.200  -0.160  -0.125  -0.090  -0.055 
2004  0.900  0.204  0.400  0.539  0.549  0.559  0.569 
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Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Luxembourg 
Year  ý  ḱ  ĺ  â (α=0.20)  â (α=0.25)  â (α=0.30)  â (α=0.35) 
1996  1.900  0.191  0.000  1.862  1.852  1.843  1.833 
1997  5.000  1.248  0.200  4.590  4.538  4.486  4.433 
1998  -1.400  -0.395  0.000  -1.321  -1.301  -1.281  -1.262 
1999  0.900  1.824  0.300  0.295  0.219  0.143  0.066 
2000  1.200  -2.268  0.100  1.574  1.692  1.810  1.929 
2001  -7.500  0.835  0.200  -7.827  -7.859  -7.890  -7.922 
2002  1.000  -0.446  -0.700  1.649  1.637  1.624  1.611 
2003  0.400  -2.502  -0.900  1.620  1.701  1.781  1.861 
2004  1.600  0.134  -1.100  2.453  2.391  2.330  2.268 
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Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Netherlands 
Year  ý  ḱ  ĺ  â (α=0.20)  â (α=0.25)  â (α=0.30)  â (α=0.35) 
1996  0.000  0.406  0.600  -0.561  -0.552  -0.542  -0.532 
1997  0.800  0.339  1.100  -0.148  -0.110  -0.072  -0.034 
1998  0.500  -0.139  1.100  -0.352  -0.290  -0.228  -0.166 
1999  -0.300  0.548  0.600  -0.890  -0.887  -0.884  -0.882 
2000  -0.500  -0.418  0.400  -0.736  -0.695  -0.655  -0.614 
2001  -2.100  -0.319  0.600  -2.516  -2.470  -2.424  -2.378 
2002  -1.300  -0.203  -0.600  -0.779  -0.799  -0.819  -0.839 
2003  -0.200  0.035  -0.900  0.513  0.466  0.420  0.373 
2004  1.800  0.303  -0.900  2.459  2.399  2.339  2.279 
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Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Norway 
Year  ý  ḱ  ĺ  â (α=0.20)  â (α=0.25)  â (α=0.30)  â (α=0.35) 
1996  0.900  0.343  0.700  0.271  0.289  0.307  0.325 
1997  -0.100  0.794  0.800  -0.899  -0.898  -0.898  -0.898 
1998  -2.600  1.095  0.800  -3.459  -3.474  -3.489  -3.503 
1999  -0.500  -0.406  0.000  -0.419  -0.399  -0.378  -0.358 
2000  0.700  -0.778  -0.200  1.016  1.045  1.073  1.102 
2001  -0.100  -0.323  -0.200  0.125  0.131  0.137  0.143 
2002  -1.600  -0.028  -0.300  -1.354  -1.368  -1.382  -1.395 
2003  0.000  -0.491  -0.600  0.578  0.573  0.567  0.562 
2004  1.700  0.348  0.100  1.550  1.538  1.526  1.513 
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Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Portugal 
Year  ý  ḱ  ĺ  â (α=0.20)  â (α=0.25)  â (α=0.30)  â (α=0.35) 
1996  -0.800  0.476  0.000  -0.895  -0.919  -0.943  -0.967 
1997  0.500  0.998  0.500  -0.100  -0.124  -0.149  -0.174 
1998  0.600  0.989  1.600  -0.878  -0.847  -0.817  -0.786 
1999  -0.800  0.406  0.600  -1.361  -1.351  -1.342  -1.332 
2000  -0.400  0.674  0.500  -0.935  -0.944  -0.952  -0.961 
2001  -1.700  -0.595  0.100  -1.661  -1.626  -1.591  -1.557 
2002  -1.300  -1.389  -1.000  -0.222  -0.203  -0.183  -0.164 
2003  -1.500  -0.515  -1.200  -0.437  -0.471  -0.505  -0.540 
2004  2.100  0.408  -0.500  2.418  2.373  2.328  2.282 
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Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Spain  
Year  ý  ḱ  ĺ  â (α=0.20)  â (α=0.25)  â (α=0.30)  â (α=0.35) 
1996  -0.400  0.299  0.600  -0.940  -0.925  -0.910  -0.895 
1997  1.500  0.586  1.200  0.423  0.453  0.484  0.515 
1998  0.600  0.597  1.700  -0.879  -0.824  -0.769  -0.714 
1999  0.200  0.365  2.400  -1.793  -1.691  -1.589  -1.488 
2000  0.300  0.364  1.500  -0.973  -0.916  -0.859  -0.802 
2001  -1.500  -0.226  0.600  -1.935  -1.893  -1.852  -1.811 
2002  -0.800  -0.398  -0.700  -0.160  -0.176  -0.191  -0.206 
2003  0.300  0.004  0.000  0.299  0.299  0.299  0.299 
2004  0.100  0.118  0.600  -0.404  -0.379  -0.355  -0.331 
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Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Sweden 
Year  ý  ḱ  ĺ  â (α=0.20)  â (α=0.25)  â (α=0.30)  â (α=0.35) 
1996  -2.600  0.352  -0.800  -2.030  -2.088  -2.145  -2.203 
1997  1.000  -0.036  -0.300  1.247  1.234  1.221  1.207 
1998  1.400  0.326  1.700  -0.025  0.043  0.112  0.181 
1999  0.800  0.616  1.500  -0.523  -0.479  -0.435  -0.391 
2000  -0.200  0.112  1.100  -1.102  -1.053  -1.004  -0.954 
2001  -3.200  -0.495  0.700  -3.661  -3.601  -3.542  -3.482 
2002  0.900  -0.433  0.000  0.987  1.008  1.030  1.052 
2003  -0.300  -0.591  -0.700  0.378  0.373  0.367  0.362 
2004  2.000  0.033  -0.800  2.633  2.592  2.550  2.508 
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Estimated percentage change in TFP Growth for Switzerland 
Year  ý  ḱ  ĺ  â (α=0.20)  â (α=0.25)  â (α=0.30)  â (α=0.35) 
1996  0.100  0.084  -0.400  0.403  0.379  0.355  0.331 
1997  1.400  0.053  -0.300  1.630  1.612  1.594  1.577 
1998  0.900  0.586  0.600  0.303  0.303  0.304  0.305 
1999  -1.500  0.286  0.600  -2.037  -2.021  -2.006  -1.990 
2000  2.300  0.469  0.300  1.966  1.958  1.949  1.941 
2001  -2.600  -0.490  0.100  -2.582  -2.553  -2.523  -2.494 
2002  -0.700  -0.747  -0.600  -0.071  -0.063  -0.056  -0.049 
2003  -0.600  -0.542  -1.000  0.308  0.286  0.263  0.240 
2004  2.400  0.077  -0.200  2.545  2.531  2.517  2.503 
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5.5.3:  Update of Alwyn Young’s estimate of TFP Growth 1970-1985 
 
The estimates of TFP growth outlined above is summarised further as an average TFP growth 
for each respective α value from 1996-2004. In order to achieve the aim of the thesis which is 
to update the TFP growth estimates calculated by Young (1994) the table below also compares 
Young’s estimates measured from 1970-1985 for each of the 21 OECD countries tested. The 
difference between Young’s estimates and the estimates calculated in the thesis is depicted in 
parenthesis (Young, 1994). This number represents the directional change in TFP growth since it 
was  first  estimated  by  Young  (1994).  This  number  has  many  important  economic  policy 
implications which will be discussed in chapter 6. 
5.5.4:  Percentage Annual Growth of TFP from 1970-1985 and 1996-2004  
Update of TFP estimates for Cluster 1 
  Young’s 
Estimates 
1970-1985 
â (α=0.20) 
1996-2004 
â (α=0.25) 
1996-2004 
â (α=0.30) 
1996-2004 
â (α=0.35) 
1996-2004 
Australia  0.700  -0.423 (-1.123)   -0.418 (-1.118)  -0.413(-1.113)  -0.408 (-1.108) 
USA  0.400  0.173 (-0.227)  0.172 (-0.228)  0.171 (-0.229)  0.170 (-0.230) 
Canada  0.300  -0.229 (-0.529)  -0.223 (-0.523)  -0.216 (-0.516)  -0.210 (-0.510) 
Japan  1.200  0.249(-0.951)  0.248 (-0.952)  0.246-(0.954)  0.244 (-0.956) 
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5.5.5:  Percentage Annual Growth of TFP from 1970-1985 and 1996-2004 
Update of TFP estimates for Cluster 2 
  Young’s 
Estimates 
1970-1985 
â (α=0.20) 
1996-2004 
â (α=0.25) 
1996-2004 
â (α=0.30) 
1996-2004 
â (α=0.35) 
1996-2004 
United Kingdom  0.900  -0.423(-1.323)  -0.418(-1.318)  -0.413 (-1.313)  -0.408 (-1.308) 
Austria  0.700  0.173 (-0.527)  0.172 (-0.528)  0.171 (-0.529)  0.170 (-0.530) 
Czech Republic  N/A  -0.229  -0.223  -0.216  -0.210 
Denmark  1.300  0.249 (-1.051)  0.248 (1.052)  0.246 (-1.054)  0.244 (-1.056) 
 
  Young’s 
Estimates 
1970-1985 
â (α=0.20) 
1996-2004 
â (α=0.25) 
1996-2004 
â (α=0.30) 
1996-2004 
â (α=0.35) 
1996-2004 
Finland  1.500  0.173 (-1.327)  0.172 (-1.328)  0.171 (-1.329)  0.170 (-1.330) 
France  0.500  -0.229 (-0.729)  -0.223 (-0.723)  -0.216 (-0.716)  -0.210 (-0.710) 
Germany  0.900  0.249 (-0.651)  0.248 (-0.652)  0.246 (-0.654)  0.244 (-0.656) 
Greece  1.200  -0.423 (-1.623)  -0.418 (-1.618)  -0.413 (1.613)  -0.408 (-1.608) 
 
  Young’s 
Estimates 
1970-1985 
â (α=0.20) 
1996-2004 
â (α=0.25) 
1996-2004 
â (α=0.30) 
1996-2004 
â (α=0.35) 
1996-2004 
Ireland  N/A  0.173  0.172  0.171  0.170 
Italy  1.800  -0.229 (-2.029)  -0.223 (-2.023)  -0.216 (2.016)  -0.210 (2.010) 
Luxembourg  1.200  0.249 (-0.951)  0.248 (-0.952)  0.246 (-0.954)  0.244 (-0.956) 
Netherlands  0.800  -0.423 (1.223)  -0.418 (-1.218)  -0.413 (-1.213)  -0.408 (-1.208) 
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  Young’s 
Estimates 
1970-1985 
â (α=0.20) 
1996-2004 
â (α=0.25) 
1996-2004 
â (α=0.30) 
1996-2004 
â (α=0.35) 
1996-2004 
Norway  1.700  0.173 (-1.527)  0.172 (-1.528)  0.171 (-1.529)  0.170 (-1.530) 
Portugal  0.400  -0.229 (-0.629)  -0.223 (0.623)  -0.216 (0.616)  -0.210 (0.610) 
Spain  0.600  0.249 (-0.351)  0.248 (-0.352)  0.246 (-0.354)  0.244 (-0.356) 
Sweden  1.000  -0.423 (1.423)  -0.418 (1.418)  -0.413 (1.413)  -0.408 (1.408) 
Switzerland  0.000  0.173 (+0.173)  0.172 (+0.172)  0.171 (0.171)  0.170 (+0.170) 
 
5.5.6:  Analysis of TFP Growth Variance from 1970-1985 and 1996-2004  
 
The empirical results outlined in subchapter 5.54 and 5.55 demonstrate the overall declining 
trend in TFP growth amongst most OECD countries The estimates of TFP growth made by Young 
(1994) during the 1970-1985 time periods seem to vary to estimates during the 1996-2004 time 
periods (Young, 1994). Firstly with the exception of Switzerland, it appears that all of the tested 
countries  have  experienced  a  decline  in  TFP  growth.  This  is  consistent  with  the  economic 
literature  discussed  in  chapter  3,  figure  3.4.  Solow  (1956)  explained  that  accumulation  of 
factors will only result in a level effect rather than a net growth effect (Solow, 1956, Krugman, 
1994  and  Taylor,  2007).  In  the  long  run  unless  there  is  an  increase  in  productivity,  factor 
accumulation will bring the economy closer to the steady state equilibrium (Solow, 1956 and 
Swan,  1956).  When  this  has  occurred  the  economy  will  experience  diminishing  economic 
output. Solow (1956) proved this by the third assumption which is illustrated in chapter 3 figure 
3.3 where the marginal productivities of capital decline (Solow, 1956 and Swan, 1956). 94  
 
In Cluster 1 it appears that Australia and Canada have transitioned through the steady state 
equilibrium and is now experiencing negative TFP growth. From the estimations it appears 
Australia has had a large decline in TFP growth since the first estimates by Young (1994) in 
1970-1985 where the TFP growth was 0.7%. This figure has dropped to -0.423% where α=0.20. 
In addition the trends in Australia’s average TFP was negative from 1998-2000. During 2001 
there was a sudden growth in TFP which then returned to a negative trend post 2002. Canada 
also seems to have experienced a similar scenario with an original TFP of 0.300 which has now 
declined 0.529% to -0.229% where α=0.20. The graphical representation of Canada’s TFP trends 
seem to be very cyclical with burst of TFP increases and decreases from 1996-2004. Conversely 
it appears that the USA and Japan have fared well as TFP growth still remains positive. The 
decline in TFP in the USA from Young’s (1994) estimates represents a -0.227% decline. Japan 
however had a relatively large TFP growth rate however the updated TFP growth rates appear 
to have fallen sharply by -0.951% to 0.249%. Referring to the graphical representations of the 
USA  and  Japan,  there  has  been  strong  positive  growth  in  TFP  from  2002-2004.  Japan  also 
experienced a spike in TFP growth during 1999-2000. 
Cluster 2 which comprises of Eurozone countries illustrates that most of the TFP growth rates 
appear to be very similar. Both Finland and Austria  had equal TFP growth rates of 0.173% 
where α=0.20, 0.25, 0.30 and 0.35. The United Kingdom, Greece, Netherlands and Sweden also 
share the same TFP growth rates of -0.423% across all of the tested α values. Portugal, Spain, 
Luxembourg and Italy also seem to have very similar TFP growth rates ranging from -0.229% 
through to -0.249%. The estimates demonstrate that these groups of economies within Cluster 95  
 
2 have exceeded the point of steady state equilibrium as Solow (1956) described. From the 
graphical representation it appears that the United Kingdom, Germany and Luxembourg have 
very similar average TFP growth trends with a large decline in TFP growth during 2001. This is a 
similar pattern to Sweden and Switzerland. The Czech Republic, Denmark Finland, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain have had prolonged negative growth in TFP between 1998 and 2002. 
Smith  (1776)  described  that  foreign  commerce  offered  valuable  trading  opportunities  for 
economic growth (Smith, 1776; Krugman, 1991b and Maddison, 2007). From the estimates 
above it appears that economic growth for the 21 OECD economies are either approaching or 
exceeding  the  steady  state  equilibrium  described  in  the  Neoclassical  Growth  Model.  The 
empirical results and graphs also suggest that Norway, Italy Greece, Finland and the United 
Kingdom have had the fastest declined in TFP growth during the 10 year gap between Young’s 
(1994) estimates and the estimates in the thesis. It appears only Switzerland has exhibited 
positive TFP growth of 0.173% from Young’s original TFP growth estimate of 0.00%. 
 
5.6:  Conclusion 
 
Chapter 5 has made an attempt to update the TFP growth rates originally estimated by Young 
(1994).  Chapter  5  has  outlined  the  scope  of  the  analysis,  the  source  of  data  and  the 
methodology of the analysis. The estimates in this thesis were made possible by using  the 
methodology described by Solow (1956 and 1957) (Solow, 1956 and Swan, 1956). Results from 
this chapter have attempted to shed some light on the progress of the 21 OECD countries 96  
 
examined in this thesis. Chapter 5 reveals the economic progress and the amount of TFP which 
is driving economic growth. From the estimates, it appears that the majority of countries are 
moving closer towards the steady state equilibrium where diminishing return begins (Solow, 
1956 and Swan, 1956). The slowdown in TFP growth after estimates by Young (1994) reflects 
observations made by Krugman (1994, p.40): 
Once one accounts for the role of rapidly growing inputs in these countries’ growth, one finds 
little left to explain. Asian Growth, like that of the Soviet Union in its high-growth era, seems 
to be driven by extraordinary growth in inputs like labour and capital rather than by gains in 
efficiency. 
 
The  estimate  of  TFP  growth  has  many  advantages  when  formulating  economic  policy  (The 
Treasury,  2003  and  2009).  Central  policy  agencies  such  as  The  Commonwealth  Treasury 
consider the impact of economic policy on the wellbeing of citizens as its major priority. The 
estimates derived in chapter 5 assists policy makers in identifying and preventing economic 
growth driven by factor mobilisation instead of efficiency gains through enhanced productivity 
(The Treasury, 2009). Chapter 6 concludes this thesis by analysing these policy implications.  97  
 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
6.1:   Policy Implications 
 
This thesis has attempted to update the TFP growth estimates calculated by Young (1994). 
Subchapters 5.54 and 5.55 outline the average TFP growth from 1996-2004. The estimates 
when contrasted with the results from Young (1994) offer central policy agencies an insight into 
productivity growth trends. This also identifies where the economy is positioned in relation to 
the  steady  state  equilibrium  (Solow,  1956;  Swan,  1956  and  Young,  1994).  Central  policy 
agencies can prevent negative TFP growth by increasing the savings rate from Sf(k) to S1f(k) so 
that it exceeds the (n+g+δ)k curve. The increased savings allows for a greater investment into 
newer and more innovative capital. Thus k will continue to rise and so too will output, rising to 
y1*  (Solow,  1956  and  Swan,  1956).  This  policy  will  temporarily  delay  the  steady  state 
equilibrium  where  the  economy  begins  to  experience  negative  TFP.  This  occurs  where  S1 
f(k)=(n+g+δ)k and is demonstrated in figure 6.1
9. 
                                                      
9 The increased savings rate is represented by S1f(k). 98  
 
Figure 6.1:  Increased Savings Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                           
Source: Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962, p. 176) 
 
Retiring old capital for more efficient capital stock allows poor and undeveloped countries to 
benefit from their relative backwardness by accelerating economic progression through time. 
Gerschenkron (1962) assumed that developing countries have access to advanced vintages of 
technology  generated  by  the  wealthier  developed  countries  (Kaldor  and  Mirrlees,  1962; 
Gerschenkron,  1962  and  Maddison,  2007).  Since  the  level  of  capital  per  capita  is  small 
economic growth in developing countries tends to be fast and the incumbent capital provides a 
productivity boost. This represents absolute or β-convergence described by Sala-i-Martin where 
poor  countries  exhibit  tendencies  for  fast  paced  economic  growth  compared  to  wealthy 
countries (Sala-i-Martin, 1996 and Gerschenkron, 1962). 
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International trade between  economies  with  similar  production  functions  can also  assist  in 
positive  TFP  growth  amongst  economies  in  close  geographical  proximity  (Smith,  1776; 
Krugman, 1991b and Maddison, 2007). Smith described that developed economies such as the 
United Kingdom and the United States engaged in regular international trade and stressed the 
importance of foreign commerce and the valuable trading opportunities from economic growth 
(Smith,  1776  and  Maddison,  1995a  and  2007).  The  increased  savings  rate  which  in  turn 
purchases more innovative capital allows for the retired capital to flow onto less developed 
economies which represents an increase in capital stock. Estimates of TFP growth can assist 
central policy agencies on matters relating to international trade with neighbouring economies 
and  also  on  the  procurement  of  new  capital  as  part  of  an  expansionary  fiscal  policy  (The 
Treasury, 2009 and 2003). 
 
6.2:  Final Remarks 
 
This thesis demonstrates that an updated estimate of TFP growth has many applications for 
central policy agencies. The importance of updated estimates provides further insight into the 
trends  of  TFP  growth  (Young,  1994).  Central  policy  agencies  can  use  this  information  to 
implement economic policy relating to international trade and expansionary fiscal policy. The 
use of updated TFP estimates reveals the proximity of the steady state equilibrium before the 
point  of  negative  TFP  growth.  To  prevent  negative  TFP  growth  economic  policies  such  as 
retiring old capital for international trade and expansionary fiscal policy to procure new capital 
will exhibit positive TFP growth for the economy (Kaldor and Mirrlees, 1962). In Australia, The 100  
 
Commonwealth Treasury acknowledges the importance of TFP estimates and actively monitors 
and publishes TFP growth patterns. This represents sound economic policy formulation which 
contributes to economic wellbeing and prosperity (The Treasury, 2009 and 2003). 101  
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